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absurd appearance argument arises assert belief body causation cause and effect ceptions cerning Charon color common comprehend conceive concerning conclusion conjoined connection betwixt consequence consider constant conjunction continued existence contrary custom Davenport David Hume degree derived determined difference betwixt discover distinct distinguishable ence endeavor England entirely equal evident examine explain external faculty fancy feel finite extension force and vivacity friends gible give human Hume idea of extension identity imagination impossible impres impressions and ideas indivisible inference infinite divisibility infinite number influence instances John Home judgment kind King of Prussia letter Lord Marshal manner memory mind motion nature never objects observe operation opinion ourselves particular passions perceive perceptions perfectly person philosophers present impression pretend principle probability produce propen qualities question reason reflection regard resemblance rience right line Rousseau sensation senses sensible sion solidity substance suppose supposition thing thought tion transition
Page 312 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 310 - THERE are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF ; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.
Page 217 - A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Page 314 - That action of the imagination by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought required in the latter case than in the former.
Page 93 - Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind ; it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.
Page 213 - Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects ; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienc'd union.
Page 264 - ... all our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirmed by the seeming increase and diminution of objects according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; by the changes in their colour and other qualities, from our sickness and distempers, and by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind; from all which we learn that our sensible perceptions are not possessed of any distinct or independent...
Page xviii - I published at London my Natural History of Religion, along with some other small pieces : its public entry was rather obscure, except only that Dr. Hurd wrote a pamphlet against it, with all the illiberal petulance, arrogance, and scurrility, which distinguish the Warburtonian school. This pamphlet gave me some consolation for the otherwise indifferent reception of my performance.