Intention and AgencyThe powers of seeing, hearing, re membering, distinguishing, judging, reason ing, are speculative powers; the power of ex ecuting any work of art or labour is active power. Thomas Reid I Some causal efficacy is due to persons. And, some of the causal efficacy due to persons is imparted by, not merely to, them. Further, some of the causal efficacy due to persons and imparted by them is imparted by and not merely to their physical, active bodies. Otherwise there is no agency. I will assume, with everyone at the outset, that the world contains agency of the kind found in some of a person's comings and goings, movings and changing of things. Agency is exhibited in more and in less sophisticated forms, that is, in any sophisticated, artful activity and in less complex, non-articulate physical activities. In both there appears to be more than mere causal efficacy imparted to the environment by a person. In sophisticated agen cy activities are organized, guided, purposive and purposeful comings and goings, movings and changes. And purpose is not absent in less soph isticated purposive activities of active creatures. So I shall argue in what follows. Now is the time for introducing the themes, topics, and issues to be considered, and the plan and purpose in them. |
Contents
Passivity and Activity in Intentional Action | 20 |
Intending Judging and the Cognitive Model | 36 |
Further and Future Intentions | 53 |
Copyright | |
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A-ing ability action predicates agency agent akrasia akratic all-out judgments animal antece antecedents appears appropriate attitudes attribution bare particular behavior beliefs bodily movement capacity causal circumstances cognitive cognitivist complex conations conative concept contents contrast course Descartes desires difference expressions of intention first-person fulfilled fully intentional action further intention further purpose future intentions human implies instance inten intend to Q intentional objectivity intentionalistic intentionally John intends Jones means nature negation normal notion objects Oedipus struck one's perceptual perform philosophy of action physical possible practical thinking present primary intentional actions propositional attitudes propositions psychological causation pump pure intending q-ing question rational rational psychology reason reference relations relevant role rude old satisfied scheme of explanation seems sense sentences sophisticated sort specific structure suppose tentional theory thing thought tion traditional truth types typically undertaking upshot verbs voluntary Wittgenstein