The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China
In the past decade, China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform, while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chinese communist political institutions are more flexible and less centralized than their Soviet counterparts were.
Shirk pioneers a rational choice institutional approach to analyze policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country and to explain the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on extensive interviews with high-level Chinese officials, she pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions and shows how the political logic of Chinese communist institutions shaped those decisions.
Combining theoretical ambition with the flavor of on-the-ground policy-making in Beijing, this book is a major contribution to the study of reform in China and other communist countries.
The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms
CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Authority Relations The Communist Party and the Government
Leadership Incentives Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability
Bargaining Arena The Government Bureaucracy
Who Is Enfranchised in the Policymaking Process?
Decision Rules Delegation by Consensus
Playing to the Provinces Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform
Creating Vested Interests in Reform Industrial Reform Takeoff 197881
Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting TaxforProfit 198283
Building Bureaucratic Consensus Formulating the TaxforProfit Policy 198384
The Power of Particularism Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting 198588
The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China
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Page 6 - As the Chinese economists put it, Deng Xiaoping and his reformist lieutenants, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, pushed against the stone wall of the Chinese bureaucracy. Where they found loose stones, they pushed through; when stones would not move, they did not waste energy pushing