Prolegomena to Ethics

Thomas Hill Green

Clarendon Press, 1883 - Ethics - 427 pages

Contents

• INTRODUCTION: 1
• For a even if we admit with Kant that there are unknown thingsin: 30
• This can be disputed only when thought is wrongly conceived as a mere: 47
• CHAPTER II: 59
• And though the relations through which the perceiving consciousness: 63
• And it is implicitly admitted that the perceiving consciousness is: 65
• The common notions of the growth of knowledge also involve this two: 69
• Nor does the epithet free take away all meaning from the word: 77
• not that this forecasting idea is present to us before the experience: 78
• Nor will our conclusion be affected if we suppose that the human: 87
• The existence of action from such motives is far more certain than: 92
• A mere want is strictly natural But a motive involves the action: 93
• To say that the motive is the outcome of circumstances and character: 98
• This point is obscured when the motive is confused with a mere desire: 106
• And though the act is a necessary result all results are necessary: 109
• CHAPTER II: 120
• and so does an impulse arising from the revived image of a past pleasure: 127
• Thus there is a real unity in all our desires only it is not Desire: 133
• Desire and intellect then are different manifestations of one self: 136
• Even if it is true that a man desires at the same time and in the same: 143
• But to call the will the strongest desire is to obliterate the distinction: 150
• The desire and thought which are separable from will and from each: 152
• or 3 the thought which is involved in willing for such thought is like: 156
• The will then is not some distinct part of a man separable from intel: 158
• But this theory which offends the unsophisticated mind owes: 164
• Mills meaning however is not this but that for example the sense: 165
• On the ground according to Mill that men knowing both do prefer: 170
• Good then being defined as that which satisfies desire true good: 171
• And this implies the union of developed will with developed reason: 184
• CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORAL IDEAL: 189
• It does so by presenting to us an unconditional good and by laying: 193
• Whatever be the difficulties attending it the idea of human progress: 195
• And although this realisation would seem to imply a difference: 201
• This duty is felt by the highest minds to be morally as binding as: 207
• CHAPTER III: 210
• The recognition of this idea by Utilitarianism in the formula Every: 213
• for there is no identity between the developed state of man and: 216
• CHAPTER IV: 232
• so that if a sum of pleasures is as a matter of fact desired this fact: 236
• If he nevertheless supposed that he sought pleasures for others this: 237
• And though it is true that a man might think of his good or happiness: 243
• Even if it were conceived as a succession of pleasures desire for it would: 249
• By such reflection the reason which had been active in social develop: 250
• And this would be seen if the questions were considered 1 whether: 255
• Thus we inherit from the Greek philosophers both the principle: 256
• The progress from this beginning to the conviction that the only true: 262
• just as a further improvement now must depend mainly on a further: 267
• Fortitude has come to involve not merely the selfdevotion of: 278
• On the contrary interest in the common good in some of its various: 283
• Accordingly if we dismiss as mistaken the idea that the pleasures: 284
• Further 2 the range of the actions which issue from temperance: 289
• For the realisation described in the Greek ideal and apparently: 295
• since the idea of human brotherhood leads to social requirements then: 301
• Ideal virtue then being defined as selfdevoted activity to the per: 309
• BOOK IV: 315
• But since for practical purposes enquiry into motive is restricted: 323
• In such cases it is certainly not for philosophy simply to destroy: 325
• And under present conditions the difference between the social: 329
• For the ideal in the conscientious mind is not a mere definition: 335
• THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF A THEORY OF THE MORAL IDEAL: 338
• Any one who puts such a question must face a preliminary difficulty: 340
• For how can the phraseology of duty be explained when nothing: 347
• There remain the cases of true perplexity of conscience in which equal: 350
• Though we cannot form a positive or detailed conception of what human: 353
• but rather to show that their commands are at once interpreted: 356
• But the Chief Good according to the theory is the greatest possible: 359
• Objections to its appeal to expediency are in the main illfounded: 362
• According to Mr Sidgwicks theory on the other hand desirable: 365
• But desirable when it is distinguished from desired seems to: 366
• Rejecting the idea that Hedonism in this way directly promotes: 369
• this being conceived as a common good and the mode in which: 381
• And this danger might become real if the Hedonistic criterion came: 388
• The tautology is avoided where the end is defined as pleasure: 411
• In these cases it appears that Universalistic Hedonism would give: 417
• On the other theory the presumption is in favour of the sacrifice: 423
• Is the unity implied in our speaking of certain phenomena as desires: 1
• Necessity of a scientific answer to these problems Can this answer: 2
• 1 Does not: 8
• This statement is denied because reality is supposed to be what is inde: 12
• Why is this conclusion which seems to be implied even in commonly: 14
• Thus the consciousness through which alone nature exists for us: 18
• That it appears to be an absolute antithesis is due to a misinterpretation: 24
• This question is admissible only if the system of relations is essentially: 30
• and this intelligence must distinguish itself from the feelings it unites: 32
• of the socalled idealism which reduces facts to feelings 38: 38

Bibliographic information

• Title: Prolegomena to Ethics
• Author: Thomas Hill Green
• Editor: Andrew Cecil Bradley
• Edition: 5
• Publisher: Clarendon Press, 1883
• Original from: Oxford University
• Digitized: Jun 15, 2007
• Length: 427 pages