Prolegomena to Ethics

Front Cover
Clarendon Press, 1883 - Ethics - 427 pages
 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

And though the relations through which the perceiving consciousness
63
The common notions of the growth of knowledge also involve this two
69
Nor does the epithet free take away all meaning from the word
77
not that this forecasting idea is present to us before the experience
78
Nor will our conclusion be affected if we suppose that the human
83
BOOK II
90
This knowledge being a knowledge of action from the inner side can only
93
99 and the character or self being a reproduction of the eternal self
99
Thus the statement that the motive is the outcome of circumstances
106
the answer is that from such a beginning no selfconsciousness could
114
Feeling of self constitutes individuality in a sense in which individuality
119
sider the nature of will in its relation to intellect and desire
120
and so does an impulse arising from the revived image of a past pleasure
127
Thus there is a real unity in all our desires only it is not Desire
133
Desire and intellect then are different manifestations of one self
136
Even if it is true that a man desires at the same time and in the same
148
The desire and thought which are separable from will and from each
152
But it is misleading to say that mere thought is not will or that will
154
The will then is not some distinct part of a man separable from intel
158
But this theory which offends the unsophisticated mind owes
164
Mills meaning however is not this but that for example the sense
165
On the ground according to Mill that men knowing both do prefer
170
Good then being defined as that which satisfies desire true good
171
And this implies the union of developed will with developed reason
177
the good actually pursued being in most cases discrepant from or
187
CHARACTERISTICS OP THE MORAL IDEAL
189
It does so by presenting to us an unconditional good and by laying
193
Whatever be the difficulties attending it the idea of human progress
195
It does enjoin however at least all the particular duties in which pro
197
The practical value of the idea of good as a criterion will be considered
198
On the other hand as society implies persons regarding themselves
199
The humanitarian idea is no unreal extension of the social obligations
208
CHAPTER III
210
for there is no identity between the developed state of man and
216
and is now fixed to a certain extent in law and in social requirement
222
This idea of justice and of a duty to man as man is at once a priori
228
And if the idea of the community of good for all men has even
263
just as a further improvement now must depend mainly on a further
267
On the contrary interest in the common good in some of its various
283
Further 2 the range of the actions which issue from temperance
289
For the realisation described in the Greek ideal and apparently
295
the Platonic or Aristotelian conception of virtue is final
301
Ideal virtue then being defined as selfdevoted activity to the per
309
As the presence of the moral ideal in the character cannot always avert
310
The Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance of Conduct
315
But since for practical purposes enquiry into motive is restricted
323
In such cases it is certainly not for philosophy simply to destroy
325
And under present conditions the difference between the social
329
For the ideal in the conscientious mind is not a mere definition
335
ideal render any service in such cases?
338
Any one who puts such a question must face a preliminary difficulty
340
For how can the phraseology of duty be explained when nothing
347
There remain the cases of true perplexity of conscience in which equal
350
Though we cannot form a positive or detailed conception of what human
353
but rather to show that their commands are at once interpreted
356
But the Chief Good according to the theory is the greatest possible
359
Objections to its appeal to expediency are in the main illfounded
362
According to Mr Sidgwicks theory on the other hand desirable
365
But desirablewhen it is distinguished from desired seems to
366
Rejecting the idea that Hedonism in this way directly promotes
369
this being conceived as a common good and the mode in which
381
CHAPTER IV
391
The tautology is avoided where the end is defined as pleasure
411
In these cases it appears that Universalistic Hedonism would give
417
With Universalistic Hedonism the presumption must be against
423
It is supposed on the ground that all desire is for pleasure to be
2
contribution to a 4
4
6 nor can either be conceived as having a nature of its own apart from
6
if so 2 does not this principle appear also as consciousness of a moral
10
If nature then means a single and unalterable order of relations what
26
and this intelligence must distinguish itself from the feelings it unites
32
If so there will be no universe but two unrelated worlds each determining
39

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Bibliographic information