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The Naturalistic Reply to Scepticism
Conceptual Schemesand Relativism
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A.J. Ayer Accordingly analytic-synthetic distinction antirealist apply argue assertible Ayer basic beliefs Bounds of Sense Carnap's view Chapter characterised claim coherence concepts of objects conceptual scheme concerning conditions of sense criteria crucial Davidson Descartes distinction effect empirical judgments entail epistemic epistemological evidence existence of objects fact foundationalism foundationalist gavagai given grasp Hume ibid idea independently issue justified beliefs Kant Kant's Kantian kind knowledge language languagehood least logically Mackie matter means metaphor necessary condition notion ontological option organisation of experience particular perceptual discourse perceptual judgments perceptual statements perceptual talk philosophical possible predicates premiss presupposed priori propositions question Quine realist reason reference reidentify relation relativism role sceptical doubt sense of perceptual sense-data sensory sentences Strawson Strawson's argument Stroud synonymy thesis things thought and talk transcendental arguments transcendental beliefs translation true truth truth-conditions understanding unperceived verification principle W.V.O. Quine warranted Wittgenstein