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Figure 8.2. Expert responses for scenario B3 of the TKML for battalion commanders.

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We found that the relationship between endorsing particular response options and being rated as effective often depended on whether subordinates, peers, or superiors were doing the rating. Obtaining ratings from multiple sources revealed that for many leadership situations there may be no one "right" answer that applies to all situations. Leaders may have to consider the varying effects that their actions may have on those with whom they interact. Through further exploration of these data, we may acquire a better understanding of the differing perspectives of platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders. For example, we can compare the responses of leaders who were rated low to those rated high on effectiveness according to different rater sources. From these data, leaders might gain insight about the expectations that others have about their performance, and thus what tacit knowledge is relevant to particular situations and dealing with particular individuals.

Applying the Products to Leadership Development

We have shown that tacit knowledge, as reflected in the above products, is related to leadership effectiveness. Therefore, these products should have value in efforts to develop effective leaders. We consider the application of these products in reference to the three pillars of leadership development within the Army. These three pillars are institutional training, self-development, and operational assignments. Although we discuss these pillars separately, we view them as serving interrelated and overlapping functions in leadership development.

Tacit knowledge in institutional training. In any domain, knowledge can be transmitted via "push" or "pull." By push, we mean that knowledge is delivered in a structured format from one source (e.g., instructor, training manual) to another (e.g., student, trainee). Knowledge of this form is typically pre-processed for the learner. It is in a form that can be readily communicated. In contrast, push means that the learner draws the knowledge from the environment as it is needed. The learner has to process the information for him or herself. Traditional classroom instruction relies on the "push" form of transmitting knowledge because it helps ensure a standard set of knowledge is conveyed.

Although tacit knowledge is by definition acquired without the support typically associated with formal training environments, the lessons of experience can be transmitted through formal instruction (e.g., classroom teaching). Tacit knowledge can be conveyed directly in the form of leadership advice or "rules of thumb," or it can be presented in the form of cases to be evaluated. In fact, the structure of tacit knowledge is conducive to case-based instruction. Tacit knowledge is based on real-world examples of the lessons leaders have learned in the process of performing their jobs. Both the leadership stories and the tacit-knowledge questions can be treated as cases to be studied.

Students can be asked, for example, to read and critique a story about a leader who questioned an order from his superior officer. The instructor can ask them to evaluate how appropriately the leader handled the situation. Alternatively, students can review the scenario presented in a tacit-knowledge question along with its associated response options. For example, the situation might describe a leader taking over a

platoon of war veterans and offer several potential responses. Students can consider what they would do in this situation, why they would consider certain options to be better than others, and what might be the potential results of choosing certain options.

The expert response profile can be examined along with the questions to learn what the experts consider to be more and less appropriate responses. Students can be asked to evaluate why the experts viewed certain options as good or bad. Instructors can ask students to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the experts' ratings. They can be asked to develop possible explanations, or rationales, for the expert responses. Similarly, the data on effectiveness ratings can be explored to find out the relationship between endorsing certain response options and perceptions of effectiveness from different rater sources. These activities may encourage students to examine the leadership situations more closely and to consider various contingencies that may influence one's assessment of different responses to those situations.

Self-development. Many of the classroom applications can also be used in selfstudy. The leadership stories and tacit-knowledge questions can be evaluated on one's own. Ideally, this information would be made accessible in an on-line format, allowing for easy access by all Army personnel. Officers could then search for and examine cases that illuminate the problems they face on the job. And they could reflect on how experts would solve a given problem and on how the "expert" solution might be viewed by various stakeholders.

Using the available data, leaders can also assess their own tacit knowledge compared to the experts. They can complete the TKML themselves by following the instructions included with the inventory. They can score their responses by comparing their ratings to the expert profile for their respective level. Their responses can be scored for particular questions, for certain categories of knowledge, or on the inventory as a whole. The scores, however, should only be used for diagnostic purposes (e.g., gauging one's tacit knowledge relative to the experts); they should not be used to make comparisons among leaders for the basis of personnel decisions. Leaders can use this feedback to suggest areas in need of development. Finally, by simply reviewing the scenarios, leaders may identify potential learning opportunities in their own experiences in which job-relevant knowledge can be acquired.

Operational assignments. The most effective way to acquire tacit knowledge is arguably through one's own experiences. However, this may not be the most efficient or guaranteed method of developing successful leaders. That is, not everyone is exposed to the same opportunities and not everyone learns effectively from their experiences. So, how can the products of our research be applied to helping leaders acquire job-relevant tacit knowledge? We address two potential avenues for improving the tacit knowledge of military leaders.

The first avenue for enhancing tacit-knowledge acquisition is by guiding leaders to key developmental opportunities. Because Army leaders spend a great deal of time in operational assignments, learning from on-the-job experiences seems almost essential for success. However, they may not know which experiences provide the best

developmental opportunities, or they may not acquire the relevant knowledge from the situation. We uncovered a number of “hidden," or tacit, developmental challenges from our interviews with Army leaders. If leaders are made aware of these key areas of development, they can seek out opportunities to learn. Mentors also can serve to foster these experiences. Mentors can identify or create learning opportunities around these key developmental challenges. They can help to orient junior officers to the developmental themes that underlie the challenging situations they face. Mentors can also coach junior leaders through these challenges, drawing on their own experiences as well as the supporting materials we have generated from our research.

The second avenue for enhancing tacit knowledge is to develop the underlying skills that support its acquisition. Three cognitive processes are proposed to underlie the acquisition of tacit knowledge. These are selective encoding, selective combination, and selective comparison (Sternberg, 1985, 1997). We explain each of these processes in more detail and discuss how they relate to other knowledge-acquisition processes identified in the literature.

The first process, selective encoding, is used to filter information from the environment. When new information is presented in a natural context, relevant information is embedded in the midst of irrelevant information. A critical task for the individual is to recognize what information from among that presented is relevant to one's purposes. A good selective encoder knows which information is worth attending to; a bad one does not. For example, an officer needs to use selective encoding to figure out what he or she needs to do beyond what is specified in Army doctrine in order to get promoted.

The second process, selective combination, is used to put together the information that is selectively encoded in a way that forms an integrated and coherent cognitive structure. It is not enough to know the relevant facts; one must see how they interrelate and form a pattern. Once an individual has decided what information is relevant, he or she must make sense of the information. A good selective combiner makes the connections between the facts that typically elude the poor selective combiner. An officer might realize, for example, that promotion is not based on effective performance in one aspect of leadership, but rather a pattern of effective performance across a number of specific areas.

The third process, selective comparison, is used to relate the new information to previously acquired information. It is not enough to encode and combine new information; the information has to be tied to some preexisting knowledge base. A good selective comparer recognizes how existing knowledge can be brought to bear on the present situation. A poor selective comparer does not readily see the relations between existing and new information. For example, an officer may use his or her prior promotional experiences as a basis for searching for cues about the important factors that determine who is promoted in the current position.

The three processes of selective encoding, selective combination, and selective comparison are not viewed as independent processes. Instead, they are used interactively to maximize one's learning on the job. A leader may be confronted with an overwhelming

amount of information in a given situation. He or she must decide not only what information to attend to, but how to make sense of it. In order to determine how to deal with the situation, the leader must also be able to rely, to some extent, on his or her prior knowledge related to the situation in order to respond in a timely and appropriate manner.

The relevance of these three processes in tacit-knowledge acquisition is reflected in the stories elicited from experienced leaders. Consider the following leadership story from a battalion commander about influencing subordinates' behaviors to illustrate these processes.

I had a brigade commander who routinely stayed at the office until 1900 each evening. The subordinate battalion commanders on down also stayed until after 1900 when they saw the commander's light go out. One day when I was on duty, I stopped in the commander's office and saw him with his feet on the desk, reading a newspaper and watching the news on TV. Since I had a good rapport with the commander, I asked what he was doing. My commander said, "I have six kids at home. This is my chance to unwind from the day and catch up on the news." I took him in my jeep and showed him that all the subordinate commanders were still at work because he was still at work. He explained his behavior at the subsequent staff call and told the commanders to close shop and go home at a reasonable time.

First, the battalion commander notices that everyone stays until after 1900 in the evening. He also notices that the brigade commander's light is turned off at the same time (selective encoding). He associates the two occurrences and arrives at the conclusion that all the subordinates wait until the brigade commander goes home before they leave (selective combination). Next, he observes that his commander has his feet up, is reading a newspaper, and is watching television (selective encoding). He recognizes that these activities together suggest that his boss is no longer working (selective combination) and based on his past interaction with the brigade commander (selective comparison) decides to ask him about his behavior. He has learned through this process that a commanding officer's behavior can have a substantial influence on his or her subordinates.

The relevance of these three cognitive processes is also supported by the literature on expert-novice differences. The literature on expertise suggests that experts take more time to analyze new problems before solving them than do novices; perceive large, meaningful patterns of information more readily than novices; and are able to draw on prior knowledge in their domain better than novices (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Sternberg, 1996). Furthermore, when faced with unfamiliar problems, expert problem solvers search for and recognize previously overlooked relevant information (selective encoding), ways of combining information (selective combination), and connections between prior knowledge and the problem situation (selective comparison) (Davidson & Sternberg, 1998).

Of course, many other processes have been used to distinguish between experts and novices. Our focus is on the processes involved in tacit-knowledge acquisition. By understanding why some leaders learn more effectively from their experiences than