Institutional Change in the Horn of Africa: The Allocation of Property Rights and Implications for Development

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Universal-Publishers, 1997 - Business & Economics - 352 pages

Traditional theories of property rights change have posited an evolutionary progression of property rights towards private property in response to changes in the relative price ratio of land compared to the other factors of production. Using case studies from two areas of Ethiopia and one area of Eritrea the dissertation demonstrates the role of political factors such as interest group preference and state intervention in directing property rights development away from a linear path. The case studies trace the development of three separate systems of property rights throughout the twentieth century up to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Analysis of history and litigation in the three areas demonstrates that in none did property rights evolve spontaneously towards privatization. In one area of the study relative price changes did not lead to changes in the system of property rights as the theory predicts. In the other two areas, changes in property rights followed a change in the relative price of land, but these changes were brought about exogenously, by the intervention of the government or interest groups in guiding property rights in a particular direction. There are two theoretical conclusions to the study 1) property rights development does not always occur when we expect it to, other factors such as vested interests and government reluctance can intervene with their development and 2) even if property rights do change in response to relative price changes, they may not always move towards privatization or greater specification. In addition, one interesting empirical result of the research was that in communal systems of land tenure the transaction costs of land transfer are higher, leading to a drag on economic efficiency in the overall economy of the region. Generally, the incorporation of political factors into the model of changing property rights leads to a less parsimonious, but more accurate description of the progression of land rights in developing countries in particular.

 

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Contents

INTRODUCTION
1
11 THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND
4
12 THE WESTERN TRADITION
6
13 PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY
9
14 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
13
15 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA
25
16 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
29
17 DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES
38
41 THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
173
42 SIDAMO PROVINCE SIDAMA SUBPROVINCE
177
43 ERITREA PROVINCE HAMASIEN SUBPROVINCE
184
44 SIDAMA AND HAMASIEN
192
45 SHOA PROVINCE TEGULET AND BULGA SUBPROVINCE
193
46 CONCLUSION
208
STRUGGLING FOR THE COUNTRYSIDE ELITE AUTONOMY AND STATE REGULATION
211
51 TAXATION
213

18 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
43
The Data Set
45
19 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION
47
110 THE CASE STUDIES
49
TOWARD A POLITICAL MODEL OF PROPERTY RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT
63
22 WHEN DO PROPERTY RIGHTS CHANGE?
65
23 HOW DO INSTITUTIONS CHANGE?
73
24 THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS
95
25 CONCLUSION
99
POWER AND ACCESS ELITE GROUPS ETHNICITY AND LAND ALLOCATION IN IMPERIAL ETHIOPIA
101
THE INTERESTED ACTORS
103
32 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COURT SYSTEM
114
33 WEALTH ACCUMULATION
115
COMPARATIVE STATICS
117
ACROSS THE BOUNDARIES
162
36 CONCLUSION
169
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN THE HORN WHAT WAS AND WAS NOT
171
52 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
232
53 EQUILIBRIUM STRUCTURES
242
A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
249
55 CONCLUSION
255
A POLITICAL MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
260
62 DEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS
262
63 WHEN DO INSTITUTIONS CHANGE?
268
64 DIRECTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
273
65 FINGERPRINTS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
290
66 THEORY MODIFICATION AND CONCLUSIONS
303
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
306
72 DISCOVERING POLITICS IN PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDIES
310
73 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT ASCERTAIN FROM THE STUDY
312
74 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
314
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
317
MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS
328
Copyright

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Page 10 - It is my thesis in this part of the paper that the emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.
Page 10 - A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.
Page 10 - Oliver E. Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985), chaps. 1-3. For a markedly different approach that also begins from the "new institutionalism," see Jonathan Bendor and Terry M.
Page 18 - The picture is less clear for Africa: see G. Feder and R. Noronha, 'Land rights systems and agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa', World Bank Research Observer, 2, 21-30 (2), 1987.

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