Levels of ExplanationKatie Robertson, Alastair Wilson This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. The different sciences furnish us with a wide variety of explanations: some work at macroscopic scales, some work at microscopic scales, and some operate across different levels. How do these different explanatory levels relate to one another, and what is an explanatory level in the first place? Over the last 50 years, more and more philosophers--both reductionists and anti-reductionists--no longer subscribe to the idea that the best explanation resides at the fundamental physical level. New challenges arise from the success of scientific explanations employing multi-level models which mix levels of explanation, from distinctive differences between levels structures in biology, cognitive science, and social science, from the apparently radical reimagining of the explanatory role of spacetime in our current best theories of fundamental physics, and from the enduring mystery of how higher-level explanations are possible in the first place. These questions naturally connect to classic philosophical ways of thinking about the relationships between levels: reduction, emergence, and fundamentality. This volume presents a snapshot of cutting-edge research on explanatory levels, from their conceptual foundations to the details of how they are used in scientific practice. |
Contents
| 1 | |
Foundations of Explanatory Levels | 25 |
Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling | 99 |
Levels of Explanation in HigherLevel Sciences | 177 |
Levels of Explanation in Physics | 235 |
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Common terms and phrases
Alastair Wilson antireductionism approach argue ation Batterman biology Cambridge causal closure causal exclusion causal model cause claim classical cognitive components conception constraint context control mechanisms counterfactual CPN Backing dependence described descriptive set theory deterministic chance dichotomy theorems different levels discussion dislocations dormitive virtue downward causation dynamical effective field theory entities epistemic example exclusion problem explanandum explanatory levels explanatory role argument facts framework function grounding hierarchy higher higher-level Humean independent interactions intervention interventionism interventionist Katie Robertson level explanations level properties levels of description levels of explanation lower mathematical mechanistic Mental Causation metaphysical multilevel multiple realization multiscale models myosin notion ontological Oxford University Press particles phenomena Philosophy of Science possible Potochnik predictions principle proof quantum question reductionism relations relationship relevant robust scales scientific explanations Section sense spacetime special science statistical mechanics strategy sufficient supervenience tion understanding values variables Weslake Woodward