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afterwards ancient appear Aristotle Arminian Augmentis authority Baconian Baconian method belongs Brucker called casuistry cause chapter character church civil comedy conceive criticism Descartes distinguished Don Quixote doubt drama Dugald Stewart edition English especially Fletcher former French Gassendi genius Grotius Hobbes human imagination inductive inductive philosophy instance Instauratio Magna Jesuits knowledge language Latin latter law of nature learned least less Leviathan literature logic Lord Bacon mankind means ment metaphysical method mind moral nations natural law Niceron Novum Organum object observed original passages perceive perhaps philosophy physical poems poetry poets political praise principles probably published quae quam quod reason reckoned religion remarkable rendered rerum Roman Rome rules says Scioppius seems Semi-pelagian sense seventeenth century Shakspeare sixteenth sometimes sophisms sovereign spirit Stewart style syllogism taste theology theory thing thought tion tragedy treatise truth words writers written
Page 157 - The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.
Page 173 - The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly...
Page 177 - To have received from one to whom we think ourselves equal greater benefits than there is hope to requite disposeth to counterfeit love, but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom, and unrequitable obligation perpetual thraldom, which is to one's equal, hateful.
Page 220 - ... unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation, or not ; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before ; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.
Page 165 - So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science; and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets...
Page 158 - But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves ; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think...
Page 176 - For what argument of madness can there be greater than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends ? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy, those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man.
Page 170 - No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be — which is to know absolutely; but only that if this be, that is ; if this has been, that has been, if this shall be, that shall be — which is to know conditionally and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing.
Page 161 - ... is all in this place and all in another place at the same time; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving schoolmen.