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pleas are to be given in, and they shall then declare whether they intend to examine witnesses vivâ voce or by depositions, and no witnesses shall be examined in the cause until such declaration is filed."

IV. Answers.

answering.

After the pleas come, in civil suits, the answers. They are Personal analogous to the answer to a Bill in Chancery; are, like it, intended for discovery and to obviate the need of proving such of the matters in complaint as are known to the other side to be true; and, like it, they are given upon oath. Personal answers are not confined to being mere echoes of the plea accompanied with simple affirmances or denials, but the respondents are further at liberty to enter into all such matters as may fairly be deemed not more than sufficient to place the transactions as to which their answers are taken in what they insist to be the true and proper light. Consequently, an objection which had been taken to an answer for redundancy was held upon this principle not to be sustained, and was overruled. (m)

The purpose being to save the expense of other evidence, (n) Requisites of. they must be precise and complete. Each specific averment should be answered. The usual concluding words, "and further or otherwise the respondent denies the said position or article to be true," allude merely to the formal part of the article and will extend no further. (0)

A person is not compellable to answer if the answer required would either criminate or degrade himself; (p) and he is bound to answer only as to his knowledge of facts, and not, as in Chancery, to the "best of his information and belief."

(m) Oliver & Peake, v. Heathcote, 2 Add. 35.

(n) Clutton v. Cherry, 2 Phill. 385; Saunders v. Saunders, 11 Jur. 738. (0) Winchlow v. Smith, 1 Lee, 417; and see Carter v. Carter, Prerog. Crt. H. T. 1840.

(p) Dysart v. Dysart, 3 Curt. 543; Swift v. Swift, 4 Hagg. Eccl. 154; Robins v. Wolseley, 1 Lee, 616, 620; Schultes v. Hodgson, 1 Add. 105. See Bishop of Norwich v. Pearse, L. R. Adm. & Eccl. 281.

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Responsive allegation.

Rules of the
Arches Court.

It is, or rather was, a frequent error of the inferior courts to confound answers with the responsive allegation. But they are distinct both in their character and effect; the one is given in on the oath of the party, whereas the latter is supported by the testimony of others. An objection to the one may exist inapplicable to the other. (q)

Answers become evidence only when read by the opposite party, and it is therefore at his option to render them so or not. (r) But the Court will if it think fit look into answers when not read. (s)

Like other pleadings they must not be redundant, (†) which has been thus explained by Dr. Lushington:-" The true meaning of the term redundant' I take to be this: the respondent is not to insert in his answer any matter foreign to the articles he is called upon to answer, although such matters may be admissible in plea; but he may in his answer allege matter by way of explanation pertinent to the articles, even if such matter shall be solely in his own knowledge and to such extent incapable of proof, or he may state matter which can be substantiated by witnesses, but in this latter instance if such matter be introduced into the answer and not afterwards put in plea or proved, the Court will give no weight or credence to such part of the answer.” (u)

The present rules of practice of the Court of Arches contain the following as to answers (No. 13):—“If on the admission of any Libel or Plea, the Proctor requires the answers of the other party thereto, he shall within three days from the time of such admission leave notice in the Registry thereof, and notice shall be given by the other Proctor within a week subsequent thereto whether he requires a requisition or Commission for (9) Morgan v. Hopkins, 2 Phill. 582.

(r) Oliver v. Heathcote, 2 Add. 35, 41.

(s) Best v. Best, 2 Phill. 161; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Hagg. Cons. 253. (t) Compare ante, pp. 232-3.

(u) Dysart v. Dysart, 3 Curt. 543.

(x) No. 13.

taking such answers, and if the party whose answers are required resides within fifty miles of London such answers shall be brought into the Registry within ten days from the date of such last notice or the issuing of such Commission, if beyond that distance then within fifteen days; but if the party to give in the answer be abroad, such farther reasonable time shall be allowed as the distance and circumstances may require. Any party in a suit producing himself for his personal answers before a surrogate may be sworn and afterwards repeated to his said Answers in default of the appearance of the other proctor if he refuse or neglect to attend."

V. Evidence.

Originally all evidence was taken down in writing, but now since 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, witnesses are examined vivâ voce in the Ecclesiastical as in other courts.

evidence.

The general principles which govern evidence in other courts Principles of should regulate that taken in the Ecclesiastical Courts. "I consider it to be of the highest importance that this Court [i.e. the Consistory Court of London], should adhere to the same rules of evidence as prevail elsewhere. Indeed I should entertain some doubts whether Ecclesiastical sentences could be received in the courts of Westminster Hall as conclusive, if it were known that they were founded on evidence altogether inadmissible by the rules of those tribunals; but however this might be it is certainly wiser to adhere to the same principles wherever practicable." (y)

not generally

sufficient.

By the general law of the Ecclesiastical Courts, one witness One witness does not make full proof; not that two witnesses are required to each particular transaction, but where one witness is sufficient there must be adminicular circumstances to corroborate his testimony. (z)

(y) Conway v. Beazeley, 3 Hagg. Eccl. 651, per Dr. Lushington. See Saph v. Atkinson, 1 Add. 162, 213; Woods v. Woods, 2 Curt. 516, 524. (z) Evans v. Evans, 1 Rob. Eccl. 173. See Simmons v. Simmons, 5

Competency.

An accused may be examined.

Promoter.

Office of the judge.

In Bishop of Norwich v. Berney, (a) where the defendant was accused of incontinence, solicitation of chastity, &c., the Privy Council held that one witness, if fully credible, was sufficient to establish the charge, but under the circumstances they required some corroboration of the witness in question.

In objecting to the competency of a witness the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts does not differ from that of other courts. (b)

It has now been decided by the present Dean of Arches, (c) and tacitly admitted by the Privy Council by the examination and cross-examination, in their presence, of the defendant in Martin v. Mackonochie, (d) contrary to the decision in Burder v. ('Neill, (dd) that in a criminal suit against a clergyman under the Church Discipline Act the defendant is by virtue of 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, ss. 1 & 2, competent and compellable to give evidence.

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SECTION III.-Criminal Suits.

The Promoter.

S to the promoter or prolocutor in criminal suits, it may be stated generally that any person being a British subject and of full age may be such, and so may minors by their guardians, and lunatics by their committees; and it is not necessary, as it is in civil suits, (e) that the promoter should show any interest. In criminal suits the "office of the judge" is promoted, that is, the proceedings are taken nominally, in the name and under the sanction of some bishop, who, it seems now established, (ƒ) may refuse to allow his sanction to be invoked. But after he

Notes of Cases, 347, 11 Jur. 830; Theakston v. Marson, 4 Hagg. Eccl. 314, a testamentary case before the present Wills Act.

(a) 36 L. J. Eccl. 8.

(b) Sergeaunt v. Sergeaunt, 1 Curt. 1, 5. Compare Woods v. Woods, 2 Curt. 524.

(c) Bishop of Norwich v. Pearse, L. R. 2 Adm. & Eccl. 281.

(d) See L. R. 3 P. C. 412-3; compare Berney v. Bishop of Norwich, 36 L. J. Eccl. 8. (dd) 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1109. (e) See ante, pp. 326-7. (f) See per the present Dean of Arches in Martin v. Mackonochie, L. R. 2 Adm. & Eccl. 123.

has given his assent, he has no control whatever over the pro-
ceedings, (g) and even though he dies or resigns his see, the
suit does not abate, but it may be continued by merely altering
the title of the suit in accordance with the changed circum-
stances. This was so decided in Bishop of Winchester v.
Wix. (b) Here a cause had been sent to the Arches Court by
letters of request from the Bishop of Winchester in the first
instance, and the letters of request were accepted by the judge
of the Arches Court. A decree by letters of request was issued,
calling upon the defendant to appear, and the defendant ap-
peared. Afterwards the Bishop of Winchester, who was the
promoter of the cause, resigned his see. It was held that the
cause had not abated, and that it might be continued at the suit
of the same promoter in his individual capacity, on the title of
the cause being amended. Sir Robert Phillimore observed, in
deciding that no abatement had occurred, "It is necessary to
consider carefully the course of proceedings in this case.
The
letters of request had been duly sent to this Court; the Court
had accepted those letters, and issued process to bring the ac-
cused party before it, and the accused party had appeared, and
was properly before the Court prior to the time when the late
Bishop of Winchester resigned his see. In the first instance,
it rested with the late Bishop of Winchester, in the exercise of
his episcopal office, to determine whether the suit should pro-
ceed or not, and in what manner: he was invested with a
discretionary power to cause his office to be promoted before
himself, or to send the case by letters of request to be heard
before this Court, either appointing a private person (his secre-
tary, for instance) to carry on the proceedings in his own name,
or by appearing himself as a voluntary promoter of the office
of the judge. He has exercised his discretion by adopting the
latter course.
This discretion he had exercised before he re-
signed his see, and as soon as this Court became properly in

(g) Maidman v. Malpas, 1 Hagg. Cons. 205, 208.
(h) L. R. 3 Adm. & Eccl. 19, 21, 22.

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