## Game TheoryEminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information. |

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - PaolaM - LibraryThingThis is a very good graduate level textbook in game theory. It is pretty hard going in terms of notation, so recommended for self study only to the most dedicated readers. However, if you do persevere ... Read full review

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Very Usefull.

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### Contents

DecisionTheoretic Foundations | 1 |

Basic Models | 37 |

Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |

Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games | 154 |

Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form | 213 |

Games with Communication | 244 |

Repeated Games | 308 |

Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games | 370 |

Coalitions in Cooperative Games | 417 |

Cooperation under Uncertainty | 483 |

539 | |

553 | |

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### Common terms and phrases

8-discounted average argmax assumption average payoff axioms Bayesian game behavioral strategy behavioral-strategy profile belief probabilities best response choose condition consider cooperative correlated equilibrium decision-maker defined denote the set efficient equation equilib example expected payoff expected utility extensive-form game feasible game F game in Figure game in strategic game theory games with incomplete given implement incentive constraints incomplete information individually rational Kakutani fixed-point theorem maximize mediation plan move multiagent representation Myerson Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium negotiate node nonempty normal representation offer optimal option outcome Pareto efficient payoff allocation payoff to player positive number positive probability probability distribution pure strategies randomized strategy randomized-strategy profile repeated game round satisfy scenario Section seller sequential equilibrium sequentially rational set of players Shapley value solution concept specifies strategic form strategic-form game strategy for player strategy profile subgame subgame-perfect equilibrium subset suppose Theorem transferable utility unique utility functions utility payoff weakly dominated