Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
A 'social trap' is a situation where individuals, groups or organisations are unable to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. Examples include civil strife, pervasive corruption, ethnic discrimination, depletion of natural resources and misuse of social insurance systems. Much has been written attempting to explain the problem, but rather less material is available on how to escape it. In this book, Bo Rothstein explores how social capital and social trust are generated and what governments can do about it. He argues that it is the existence of universal and impartial political institutions together with public policies which enhance social and economic equality that creates social capital. By introducing the theory of collective memory into the discussion, Rothstein makes an empirical and theoretical claim for how universal institutions can be established.
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Review: Social Traps and the Problem of TrustUser Review - Lars Sjöblom - Goodreads
This is one of my favourite books I've read in university! Tells about social capital and trust and how the lack of it breeds corruption, tax evasion and so on. Bo Rothstein is always a pleasure to ... Read full review
On the rational choice of culture
On the theory and practice of social capital
Social capital in the social democratic welfare state
How is social capital produced?
The problem of institutional credibility
Trust and collective memories
The transition from mistrust to trust
The conditions of trust and the capacity for dialog
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action actors Adalen administration agents analysis argued argument behavior believe Bonasera causal mechanisms citizens civil society collective memory communist cooperation correlation corruption countries create culture Dagens Nyheter democracy economic empirical established ethnic example exist explain game theory German Hansson Hardin homo economicus human impartial important individuals interest interpersonal trust Johansson kind labor market labor peace law merchants leaders logic Masada mistrust moral negotiations officials open conflicts Ostrom parties percent political institutions political science problem programs Putnam question rationalist reason result Riksdag Robert Putnam Rothstein rule of law Saltsjobad Accords self-interest shows situation social capital social democratic social networks social norms social sciences social trap social trust strategy survey Sweden Swedish welfare taxes temperance movement theoretical tion trusters trustworthy union movement universal institutions Uslaner voluntary associations voluntary organizations welfare workers Yehuda Bauer