Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947-1971
What does a high practitioner of the military art and sciences, a successful commander and trainer of men, and an outstanding general staff officer find in his thirty-two years of service and two wars? First, that political guidance and military strategic thinking are virtually absent in our affairs of the state. Higher direction of war is well below the poverty line. Singh autopsies the 1965 war as the main example of this poverty. Startlingly, he shows that when the war was joined, a fair proportion of field commanders who failed had already been found wanting in the eastern theatre in 1962. Higher direction was tentative and ad hoc at the Army HQ level. At the theatre level, forward command was being exercised by the theatre commander at battalion levels, who was unable and unwilling to read the big picture and act on wide open operational possibilities being presented on a plate by the enemy. This book lays to rest many operational ghosts of 1965.
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Command of 80 Infantry Brigade
Brigadier General StaffHQ XV Corps
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