Responsibility and Distributive JusticeCarl Knight, Zofia Stemplowska Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. Responsibility and Distributive Justice both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards. Written by established experts in the field and emerging scholars, it contains essays previously unpublished in academic books or journals. It will be of interest to researchers and students in political and moral philosophy. |
Contents
An Introduction | 1 |
1 Luck EgalitarianismA Primer | 24 |
2 Justice Equality Fairness Desert Rights Free Will Responsibility and Luck | 51 |
3 Four Approaches to Equal Opportunity | 77 |
4 Luck Egalitarianism and Group Responsibility | 98 |
Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions | 115 |
6 Mad Bad or Faulty? Desert in Distributive and Retributive Justice | 136 |
7 Responsibility Desert and Justice | 152 |
9 The Public Ecology of Responsibility | 187 |
10 The Apparent Asymmetry of Responsibility | 216 |
11 Taking Up the Slack? Responsibility and Justice in Situations of Partial Compliance | 230 |
12 Luck Prioritarian Justice in Health | 246 |
13 Individual and Social Responsibility for Health | 266 |
| 287 | |
| 303 | |
8 Responsibility and False Beliefs | 174 |
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Common terms and phrases
action agent responsibility argue argument Arneson asymmetry basally responsible behaviour benefit brute luck Cambridge chapter choice or fault circumstances claim cognitive comparative fairness compensation conception concern consequentialist desert distributive justice Dworkin egalitarian justice Equal Opportunity equality of opportunity Ethics ex ante example fact fault or choice FEO for health FEOP foreseen value G. A. Cohen harm Harvard University health equity health inequalities imaginary outcomes individual responsibility influence justice as fairness liberal luck egalitarian matter moral neutrality normative objection obligations one’s Opportunity for Welfare option luck Oxford University Press people’s person Philosophy and Public Political position principle priority proportional justice prudent Public Affairs public ecology question Rawls Rawls’s Rawlsian reasons relevant requires responsibility sensitivity responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism responsibility-sensitive justice retributive justice risk Ronald Dworkin Scheffler sense situation social equals society someone Theory of Justice unfair unjust value impact worse-off