The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 1Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust. |
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agencies agreement analysis anticompetitive antitrust enforcement Antitrust Law Journal antitrust policy assess behavior bilateral monopoly buyer power cartel collusion compete competition law Competition Policy competitors conduct consumer welfare contracts Cournot court customers damages decisions demand deterrence discussion DOJ and FTC dominant firm downstream firm efficiencies empirical entry equilibrium European example Federal Trade Commission firm’s harm Horizontal Merger Guidelines hospital merger incentive Industrial Organization input intermediate issues Journal of Economics Law and Economics Law Review Lerner Index literature litigation marginal cost market definition market power market share merged firm merger simulation Microsoft monopolist monopsony monopsony power multisided platforms network effects Normann oligopoly optimal outcomes output physicians plaintiff postmerger potential predatory pricing premerger price increase profit-maximizing profits reduce regimes regulation result rivals Section sellers settlement Shapiro Sherman Act strategies structural suppliers theory tion Two-Sided Two-Sided Markets unilateral effects United upstream vertical mergers vertically integrated