Equality and Legitimacy
This book examines the relationship between the idea of legitimacy of law in a democratic system and equality, conceived in a tripartite sense: political, legal, and social. Exploring the constituent elements of the legal philosophy underlying concepts of legitimacy, this book demonstrates how a conception of democratic legitimacy is necessary for understanding and reconciling equality and political legitimacy by tracing and examining the conceptions of equality in political, legal, and social dimensions.
In the sphere of political equality this book argues that the best construction of equality in a democratic system - which resonates with the legitimizing function of majority rule - is that of equality of political opportunity. It is largely procedural, but those procedures represent important substantive values built into a majoritarian system. In the sphere of legal equality it argues that a plausible conception of non-discrimination can be constructed through a "reflective equilibrium" process, and should reject a thoughtless assumption that the presence of some particular criteria of differentiations necessarily taints a legal classification as discriminatory. Finally, the chapters on social equality explore, in some detail, the currently influential, and presumptively attractive, "luck egalitarianism": the idea that social equality calls for neutralizing the disparate effects of bad brute luck upon a person's position in society.
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Alexy argued argument assets authority basis Calculus of Consent chapter characteristics choice citizens claim classification compensation consequences consider constitutional decisions deliberation democracy democratic discrimination discriminatory distinction distribution effect equality of outcome equality of resources example expensive tastes fact factors factual equality fundamental Grutter ibid ideal of equality identify immutable impact important individual inequalities intuitive Jeremy Waldron John Rawls Joseph Raz judgments justified law’s legal equality legislation legitimacy legitimate lottery luck egalitarianism majority rule matter morally arbitrary natural neutralization normative notion one’s opportunity option luck outcome particular people’s person plausible political equality position preferences principle of equality procedural procedural democracy purpose question racial Rawls Raz’s reasons relevant requirement responsibility Ronald Dworkin Scheffler self-ownership sense social equality society specific strict scrutiny substantive talents Theory of Justice tion treatment unchosen unequal University Press values vote