## The Theory of Learning in GamesIn economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems. In |

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### Contents

Introduction | 1 |

Fictitious Play | 29 |

Replicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models | 51 |

Stochastic Fictitious Play and MixedStrategy Equilibria | 101 |

Adjustment Models with Persistent Randomness | 137 |

ExtensiveForm Games and Selfconfirming Equilibrium | 175 |

Nash Equilibrium Large Population Models and Mutations | 201 |

Sophisticated Learning | 231 |

References | 266 |