The Theory of Learning in Games

Front Cover
MIT Press, 1998 - Business & Economics - 276 pages
1 Review

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.

In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.


What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.


Fictitious Play
Replicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models
Stochastic Fictitious Play and MixedStrategy Equilibria
Adjustment Models with Persistent Randomness
ExtensiveForm Games and Selfconfirming Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium Large Population Models and Mutations
Sophisticated Learning

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 267 - Schapire. A decision theoretic generalization of on-line learning and an application to boosting.

References to this book

All Book Search results »

About the author (1998)

David K. Levine is John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics at Washington University, St. Louis.

Bibliographic information