Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate FinanceIn this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provocative examination addresses essential issues facing American businesses today as they compete in the new international marketplace. |
Other editions - View all
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Mark J. Roe No preview available - 1996 |
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Mark J. Roe No preview available - 1994 |
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active affiliates American banks American firms antitakeover laws antitrust Armstrong assets Bank Holding Company banking system Berkshire Hathaway Berle-Means blocks of stock boardroom capital competition concentrated Cong Congress corporate governance costs Delaware Deutsche Bank diversification Dresdner Bank employees equity ERISA Federal Reserve financial institutions financial intermediaries firm’s firm’s stock fragmentation fund’s German German banks Germany and Japan Glass-Steagall Glass-Steagall Act GM’s historical ideology influence institutional investors insurance companies insurer’s interest group investment bankers Investment Company Japan Journal keiretsu large firms largest Law Review legislation main bank managerial ment monitoring mutual funds nomic organization organizational ownership structure passivity pension funds pension plans percent poison pill political politicians portfolio firm private pension problems prohibited proxy regulation restrictions risk role securities markets Senate shareholders stockholders supra note take big blocks takeovers tion today’s trust United voting Wall Street Wall Street Journal York