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1's response function absence agreement is reached assume that country B^Xj behaviour of country benefit and cost CFC emissions contract curve cooperative agreement cooperative solution cost functions countries act selfishly country 1's response country 1's unilateral country's curve for country dh dh dh disagreement point dW dX dX^dXj dXj/dh effect of emissions Efficiency Wages emissions in excess emissions of CFC environmental groups equal or proportional given global character global climate global environmental problems illustrated in Figure implying interior solution ISBN Karl Ove Moene Montreal convention Moral Hazard Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium negotiated agreement non-cooperative game Norway ozone layer Pareto efficient reduce total emissions reducing its emissions reductions of harmful redused response curve side payments simultaneous move game slope solve global environmental Stackelberg equilibrium Stackelberg game Steinar Holden total welfare unilateral reduction University of Oslo unselfish behaviour unselfish environmental policy unselfish policy Wage Bargaining X2 goes