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accident angle antecedent apparent magnitude arch Archimedes axis body called cause centre of equiponderation chapter circle circumference compounded consequent continual proportionals copulated Coroll crooked line deficient figure definition demonstrated described difference diurnal motion divided doth drawn parallel earth ecliptic effect efficient cause endeavour equal equipollent Euclid fluid geometricians geometry gism greater hath hyperlogism impetus infinite lastly length transmitted less let the strait line A B living creature magnitude manifest manner means medium moved movent natural philosophy parallelogram phantasm philosophy pia mater plane ponderant portion proceed produced proportion of A B proposition propounded quantity radius ratiocination reason refracted rest semiperimeter sense side simple motion sine soever space superficies supposed syllogism taken tasm thereof things third three-sided figure tion triangle true understood uniform motion velocity whatsoever Wherefore whole
Page 3 - PHILOSOPHY is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation: And again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects.
Page 18 - John, and the rest severally) is therefore called an universal name; and therefore this word universal is never the name of any thing existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when a living creature, a stone, a spirit, or any other thing, is said to be universal, it is not to be understood, that any man, stone, &c.
Page 202 - ENDEAVOUR to be motion made in less space and time than can be given ; that is, less than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number ; that is, motion made through the length of a point, and in an instant or point of time.
Page 34 - From hence also this may be deduced, that the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received them from the imposition of others. For it is true (for example) that man is a living creature, but it is for thm reason, that it pleased men to impose both these names on the same thing.
Page 17 - But seeing names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it is manifest that they are not signs of the things themselves; for that the sound of this word stone should be the sign of a stone, cannot be understood in any other sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it thinks of a stone.
Page 34 - Wherefore, as men owe all their true ratiocination to the right understanding of speech, so also they owe their errors to the misunderstanding of the same ; and as all the ornaments of philosophy proceed only from man, so from man also is derived the ugly absurdity of false opinion.
Page 401 - Appetite, therefore, and aversion are simply so called as long as they follow not deliberation. But if deliberation have gone before, then the last act of it, if it be appetite, is called will; if aversion, unwillingness.
Page 390 - ... though the whole page be presented to our eye; and though every several letter be distinctly written there, yet when we look upon the whole page at once, we read nothing. From hence it is manifest, that every endeavour of the organ outwards, is not to be called sense, but that only, which at several times is by vehemence made stronger and more predominant than the rest; which deprives us of the sense of other phantasms, no otherwise than the sun deprives the rest of the stars of light, not by...
Page 127 - The writers of metaphysics reckon up two other causes besides the efficient and material, namely, the ESSENCE, which some call the formal cause, and the END, or final cause; both which are nevertheless efficient causes. For when it is said the essence of a thing is the cause thereof, as to be rational is the cause of man, it is not intelligible; for it is all one, as if it were said, to be a man is the cause of man; which is not well said.