Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, Daniel Whiting
Oxford University Press, 2018 - Philosophy - 284 pages
What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and vice versa. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers focuses on a central concern of both epistemology and ethics: normativity. Normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. The volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. It represents a burgeoning research programme in which epistemic and practical normativity are seen as two aspects of a single topic, deeply interdependent and raising parallel questions.
 

Contents

Introduction
1
Putting Fallibilism to Work
12
Pragmatic Approaches to Belief
26
The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons
47
Directives for Knowledge and Belief
68
How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence
90
Evidence and Its Limits
115
The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason
137
Pragmatic Encroachment Its Problems Are Your Problems
162
Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief
179
Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief
200
Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity
221
Reasoning with Reasons
241
Epistemic Instrumentalism Permissibility and Reasons for Belief
260
Index
281
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