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IV STABILITY FOR CHARACTERISTICFUNCTION GAMES
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2-player coalitions analysis assumptions bargaining set cf-games Chapter characteristic function characteristic-function form characteristic-function game complementary coalition compound game Consider the point constant extension contain Cooperative Games counter counterobjecting coalition cube decision problem domination relation e-form e-games effectiveness form example 3.1 example 4.9 exist fertilizer finite Furthermore Game Theory games with side Games Without Side garden Hence lemma main simple solutions minimal objection minimal p-strongly stable minimal winning coalition nonempty normal form objecting coalition objection and counterobjection option p-countered p-strong payments in transferable payoff permutations player 1 receives player 3 receives possible prime counterobjection set prime objection set prime set Proof provide a counterobjection receives less receives zero restricted retentive counterobjection satisfying set of outcomes Shapley's theorem side payments simple set solution concepts strategy strong stability strongly stable sets subset superadditivity symmetric simple game theory tion transferable utility type of stability utility function vector weakly Pareto optimal