The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

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Cambridge University Press, Aug 21, 2003 - Philosophy
Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.
 

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Contents

1 The Value of Knowledge Is External to It
1
2 The Value of True Belief
28
3 The Value of Justification
44
4 Reliabilism Normativity and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology
76
5 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge
108
6 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable
140
Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches
157
8 Knowledge and Understanding
185
9 Conclusion
204
References
207
Index
213
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