Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property and LitigationOver the past two decades, the field of law and economics has matured to the point where scholars have employed the latest economic methods in an effort to understand the nature of legal rules and to guide legal reform. This book is the first to provide a broad survey of this scholarship as it has been applied to problems in torts, contracts, property, and litigation. It will therefore serve as a convenient reference guide to this exciting field. |
Contents
| 3 | |
The Economics of Tort Law The Basic Model | 15 |
The Economics of Tort Law Extensions | 39 |
The Economics of Contract Law Remedies for Breach | 71 |
The Economics of Contract Law Mistake Impossibility and Other Doctrines | 92 |
The Economics of Property Law | 115 |
Government Taking and Regulation of Private Property | 137 |
The Economics of Litigation and Settlement | 156 |
The Economics of Frivolous Litigation | 181 |
Notes | 201 |
| 220 | |
| 231 | |
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Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property and Litigation Thomas J. Miceli No preview available - 1997 |
Common terms and phrases
abatement accident adverse possession argument assume bargaining behavior buyer Cā chapter choice choose Coase theorem comparative negligence consider context contingent fee contract contributory negligence court defendant defendant's discovery doctrine due standard economic analysis efficient breach eminent domain enforcement English rule equilibrium ex ante ex post examine example expectation damages expected costs expected value externality file suit first-order condition frivolous litigation frivolous suits given go to trial impact implies incentive increase induce efficient Landes and Posner landowner last clear chance laundry Law and Econ legal error Legal Stud legitimate suits liability rules liquidated damage litigation costs maximize Miceli minimize modification negligence rule Note outcome owner parties plaintiff probability promisee promisor property rules regulation reliance remedy result risk sharing Rubinfeld seller settle Shavell strict liability suppose tion transaction costs uncertainty untaken precaution yields zero
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Page 6 - If there is no reliable mechanism for eliciting express consent, it follows, not that we must abandon the principle of consent, but rather that we should look for implied consent, as by trying to answer the hypothetical question whether, if transaction costs were zero, the affected parties would have agreed to the institution.ā