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abstract ideas absurd Alciphron angle answer apparent magnitude appear Atheism Berkeley Berkeley's betwixt bodies cause ceived Cloyne colour Commonplace Book conceive consider corporeal substance David Hume demonstration Descartes distance distinct Divine doctrine doth edition Essay on Vision Euphranor evident existence experience external farther figure finite geometry George Berkeley greater hath Hence human Hylas ideas of sight imagine infinite infinitely divisible judge knowledge Leibniz living mind Locke Locke's magnitude Malebranche material world mathematicians Matter mean mind motion nature objects of sight perceiv'd perceived by sight perception percipient Phil Philonous philosophers Principles rays realised reality reason retina scepticism sect seems sensation sensible qualities sensible things shew shewn sight and touch signify simple idea sort soul Spirit substance suggest suppose Theory of Vision thought tion truth understanding universe unperceived visible extension visual visual perceptions volition whereof words
Page 256 - For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself.
Page 338 - ... we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity ; everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God, as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.
Page xxxii - Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind...
Page 258 - By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves...
Page 189 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?
Page 339 - Ye who turn judgment to wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth, seek him that maketh the seven stars and Orion, and turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night: that calleth for the waters of the sea, and poureth them out upon the face of the earth: The Lord is his name: that strengtheneth the spoiled against the strong, so that the spoiled shall come against the fortress.
Page 270 - The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things: and those excited in the Imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas; that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to...
Page 334 - We may not I think strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them.
Page 336 - ... laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals ; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid spirit, who works all in all, and by whom all things consist.