Aporetics: Rational Deliberation in the Face of Inconsistency
The word apory stems from the Greek aporia, meaning impasse or perplexing difficulty. In Aporetics, Nicholas Rescher defines an apory as a group of individually plausible but collectively incompatible theses. Rescher examines historic, formulaic, and systematic apories and couples these with aporetic theory from other authors to form this original and comprehensive survey. Citing thinkers from the pre-Socratics through Spinoza, Hegel, and Nicolai Hartmann, he builds a framework for coping with the complexities of divergent theses, and shows in detail how aporetic analysis can be applied to a variety of fields including philosophy, mathematics, linguistics, logic, and intellectual history.
Rescher's in-depth examination reveals how aporetic inconsistency can be managed through a plausibility analysis that breaks the chain of inconsistency at its weakest link by deploying right-of-way precedence based on considerations of cognitive centrality. Thus while involvement with cognitive conflicts and inconsistencies are pervasive in human thought, aporetic analysis can provide an effective means of damage control.
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abandoned accept accordingly actual alternative analysis of counterfactuals answers antecedent aporetic cluster aporetic conflict aporetic inconsistency aporetic situation apory approach to counterfactuals arises assumption averting basis beliefs Bizet causal chain of inconsistency choice claim cognitive cognitivism coherence theory Coherentism coherentist commitments confronted consider the following considerations consistency context contradiction counterfactual analysis counterfactual conditional Counterfactual History course deliberation determine dialectic difficulty distinctions Empedocles epistemic epistemology evidentiation example fact false fundamental Heracleitus historical counterfactuals hypothesis hypothetical idea incompatible individually plausible inquiry involved issue Julius Caesar Keith Lehrer Lewis Lewis’s logic matter meaningless minimal morally nature Nicholas Rescher not-p not-q one’s overall paradox philosophical possible worlds precedence and priority Preface Paradox presumption principle problem proceed propositions Protagoras questions Ramsey Ramsey’s rational reasoning regarding Reject relevant requires resolution resolve Robert Stalnaker simply sort specific speculative Stalnaker suppose supposition systemic terfactuals thesis things tion tive true truth candidates truthifying Verdi weakest link