Justifying Blame: Why Free Will Matters and why it Does NotThis book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, "morally monstrous-like" crimes and weak-willed actions of some. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
FOUR | 22 |
Practical Compatibilism and Ultimacy Pessimism | 29 |
2 | 42 |
Freedom and Blameworthy Actions | 57 |
6 | 63 |
A Describing versus Prescribing | 72 |
Conclusion | 80 |
Modesty and the Production of EBAS | 90 |
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Common terms and phrases
able act wrongly addiction ADNDS alternative possibilities argue argument assume assumption autonomy-related distinctions autonomy-undermining Axiology believe blame blameworthy actions blameworthy agents bodily movements Busy Mary chapter circumstances claim co-determine conditional analysis consequence culpable choices daily practices deeply responsible determinism is true deviant action deviant behavior deviant human disagree discussion Ethics evaluation example excusing or exempting existence expectations that regulate flicker of freedom Frankfurt counterexamples Gary Watson incompatible individual instance Journal of Philosophy Meta-ethics moral luck moral responsibility moral sentiments no-blame view normal human normative community normative disagreements normative expectations transgressed norms and values notion Ontology participants person possess the RR practical compatibilism practical compatibilist practices of responsibility principle reactive attitudes reflective self-control regard relevant Repr responsible human robust RR abilities sense sibility someone Strawson Susan Wolf take responsibility Teen Mary tion tive ultimacy pessimism ultimacy pessimist understand Wallace's Wolf's wrong actions wrongdoers