Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization |
Contents
TOWARD A New InstITUTIONAL ECONOMICS | 1 |
Three Illustrations | 20 |
PEER Groups and SIMPLE HIERARCHIES | 41 |
Copyright | |
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adaptive advantages agreement alternative analysis antitrust argument assessment assumed attributable auditing bargaining behavior bounded rationality capital market ceteris paribus Chapter circumstances collusion competition complex condition conglomerate contingent claims contracts decision decision-making default failure discussion distortions divisionalized economic effects efficiency employment relation enforcement enterprise entrants entry exchange factors favor firm and market first-mover advantages idiosyncratic incentive individual information impactedness inside contracting interfirm internal labor markets internal organization involved issues joint-profit maximization large firms learning-by-doing less limited M-form market failure market structure markets and hierarchies ment modes monopolistic monopoly moral hazard nontrivial oligopolistic oligopoly operating opportunism opportunistic organization form organizational failures framework organizational innovations outcomes parties peer group performance posed potential price discrimination problems profit maximization realized reasons regarded requires respect result risk rivals Section sequential simple hierarchy small-numbers stage Stigler strategic supply technological tion transaction costs types uncertainty vertical integration workers