Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
In Order without Law Robert C. Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules-social norms-that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory, and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law. The springboard for Ellickson's theory of norms is his close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle in Shasta County, California. In The Problem of Social Cost --the most frequently cited article on law--economist Ronald H. Cease depicts farmers and ranchers as bargaining in the shadow of the law while resolving cattle-trespass disputes. Ellickson's field study of this problem refutes many of the behavioral assumptions that underlie Coase's vision, and will add realism to future efforts to apply economic analysis to law. Drawing examples from a wide variety of social contexts, including whaling grounds, photocopying centers, and landlord-tenant relations, Ellickson explores the interaction between informal and legal rules and the usual domains in which these competing systems are employed. Order without Law firmly grounds its analysis in real-world events, while building a broad theory of how people cooperate to mutual advantage.
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animals attorney behavior boundary fence buys the cow California Caton's Folly cattle cattle-trespass claims close-knit group closed-range ordinance closure Coase Coase Theorem contract controller-selecting cooperation Court damages deadweight losses disputes Donald Black Econ Economics enforcement entitled example fence costs foothills formal Frank Ellis game theory gossip govern grazing Guido Calabresi Heinz herds highway hypothesis infra Chapter interviewed land law-and-society legal rules Legal Stud legal system liability livestock mental account motorists negligence neighbors norm-makers Northeastern Sector Oak Run open range parties payoffs person predicted Prisoner's Dilemma punish ranch rancher ranchette owners regard remedial norms response risk Robert Axelrod Roseburg Round Mountain rural residents rural Shasta County sanctions scholars self-help Shasta County cattlemen Shellworth social control sperm whales statute substantive supra Chapter supra note system of social tenant tend text accompanying notes theory tion tort traditionalist transaction costs trespass trespass victim utilitarian welfare welfare-maximizing whale