Anticorruption in Transition 2: Corruption in Enterprise-state Interactions in Europe and Central Asia, 1999-2002
World Bank Publications, Jan 1, 2004 - Juvenile Nonfiction - 81 pages
Controlling corruption is an essential part of good governance and poverty reduction, and it poses an enormous challenge for governments all around the world. Anticorruption in Transition 2 analyzes patterns and trends in corruption in business-government interactions in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It points to some encouraging signs that the magnitude and negative impact that corruption exerts on businesses may be declining in many countries in the region. It also shows how some types of firms - most notably small private ones - encounter more corruption than others, and it underscores the importance of policy and institutional reforms in achieving long-term success in the fight against corruption. The longer-term sustainability of recent improvements is not certain, however, and the challenges ahead remain formidable.
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2002 Utilities Adjusted R-squared administrative corruption Albania analysis Anticorruption in Transition Armenia Azerbaijan BEEPS data BEEPS2 Belarus bold and italics Bosnia and Herzegovina bribe frequency bribe payments bribe tax bribery bribes paid Bulgaria business environment Captor Firms City cost of corruption coun Croatia Customs & Imports Czech Republic direct costs EBRD Estimatio Corruption Europe and Central Figure firm characteristics Foreign forms of corruption frequency of bribes Frequency of Various Government Tenure Govt Hungary impact institutional reforms italics significant Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Licenses & Permits Lithuania measures of corruption Method of Estimatio Moldova nomic obstacle to business Oependent Variable Older overall pay bribes percent significant percent TABLE perceptions of corruption Poland policy and institutional public officials Recent Election Robust p values Romania ruption sample firms Share of Captor Slovak Republic Slovenia Sub-regional Grouping surveys TABLE A3 Tajikistan tion transition countries trends in corruption Types of Bribes Ukraine Uzbekistan values in bold
Page 10 - Transition, state capture refers to "the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.
Page ix - In fact, in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most of the competition law cases have been abuse-of-monopoly cases against regulated natural monopolists.
Page 16 - It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular "additional payments" to get things done: (1) always, (2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom, (6) never.
Page 84 - In the transition economies of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, gradual integration with EU energy sectors could conceivably generate positive environmental effects (from energy efficiency improvements and fuel-switching).
Page ix - EU are incentives to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to...
Page 60 - Average value of gifts or informal payments to public officials to "get things done" with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and the like.
Page viii - EU European Union FYROM former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GDP Gross Domestic Product...
Page 50 - One cannot simply say that corruption is going up or down in individual countries, as we find a complex web of movements and mutations across different forms, features and dimensions of corruption. We need to be cautious and modest and to constantly recognize the full complexity of the measurement effort.
Page 34 - Policy reforms that liberalize the economy generally reduce the power and discretion of public officials and therefore reduce both their opportunities to demand bribes and the benefits that firms derive from bribery. Reforms in public sector management strengthen transparency and accountability and thereby reduce incentives for corrupt behavior.