Outlines of Practical Philosophy: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze

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Ginn, 1885 - Conduct of life - 156 pages
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Page 58 - To antiquity, man appeared without any manifest attachment to a coherent system, transcending his earthly life, pre-eminently as a creature of nature, whose aim — not so much moral as altogether natural — could only consist in bringing all the bodily and spiritual capacities with which he is endowed by nature, to the most intensive, and at the same time harmonious, cultivation. . . . This whole culture is not a preparation of the powers for a work to be accomplished ; but it is a self-aim to...
Page 44 - Starting from a multitude of elements absolutely at rest, no motion can be produced. Now how far soever we pursue a still further deduction, it nevertheless invariably presupposes other new motions ; we are compelled to admit, that motion does not attain to actuality as the result of any cause whatever, but it is motion, without cause and from the beginning. And now if this must be once for all admitted as an existing fact, then there is no reason why perfectly new beginnings of a subsequent origin,...
Page 59 - Just the opposite of this, under the influence of Christianity, the conviction is formed, that, strictly speaking, every man is called only to the service of others; that the effort to concentrate all possible excellences in one's own person is, at bottom, only a 'shining vice...
Page 21 - ... we can leave the different values of pleasure also to be immediately revealed to us by the voice of conscience, precisely as we learn of its existence in general only from experience ; and it is nothing but pedantry to be unwilling to take for granted this knowledge from such a source, and demand for it instead some origin as a matter of method more profound.
Page 33 - There is such a thing as moral judgment of conduct only upon the assumption that this conduct leads to pleasure or pain. But to this conscience joins the further truth, that it is not the effort after our own, but only that for the production of another's felicity, which is ethically meritorious ; — and, accordingly, that the idea of benevolence must give us the sole supreme principle of all moral conduct.
Page 45 - ... freedom may be realised in the midst of mechanical uniformity; how it may, so to speak, annex the latter, and use it in its own interests. In a narrower sense Necessity, interpreted as Uniformity, may be called " the co-element of freedom." As Lotze says : " Freedom itself, in order that it may even be thought of as being what it aims at being, postulates a very widely extended, although not an exclusive, prevalence of the law of causation.
Page 19 - ... but is a formal service that arises from a complete misunderstanding." Again: "There is nothing at all in all the world which would have any value until it has produced some pleasure in some being or other capable of enjoyment. Everything antecedent to this is naught but an indifferent kind of factor to which a value of its own can be ascribed only in an anticipatory way, and with reference to some pleasure that is to originate from it.
Page 35 - That quite decided form of Determinism, which makes all the actions of animate beings proceed according to general laws from their inner spiritual states, with the same necessity as physical effects do from their blind causes, is in itself considered perfectly clear and free from contradiction.
Page 37 - He who is pleased with this complete transmutation of human life into a play of fatalistic forces, void of merit and blame, is not to be confuted on speculative grounds. The moving reason for contradicting such views lies entirely in an undemonstrable but strong and immediate conviction that it is not so, and that the conception of ' an ought ' and of an obligation, which finds no place at all in such a view, has nevertheless, the most indubitable and incontrovertible significance.

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