What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
absolute absolute idealism abstract actual admit antinomy appears argument Aristotle aspect attitude axiom behaviour believe claim colour common sense concept concrete consciousness contradiction course critical point deduction define deny dialectic distinct doctrine dogma dualism empirical entity event exclusive existence experience external fact give Hegel Hegelian human idealism idealists identity implies independent individual infinite instance intellectual internalist intuitionism ipse dixit Kant knowledge logical matter means mental method mind monism motive mystic nature never object Objectivism pantheism particular partisan perhaps philosophy Platonic Platonic realism point of view positive potential practical pragmatism pragmatist present principle of internal problem rationalistic realism reality reason reductio ad absurdum refute relation religion religious rience scientific seems side social solipsism subjectivism Summa Theologica synthesis theory things thinkers Thomism thought tion true truth ultimate unity universe whole
Page 271 - To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.
Page 379 - Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are...
Page 276 - Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active.
Page 245 - To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.
Page 247 - The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience...
Page 270 - The alternative between pragmatism and rationalism, in the shape in which we now have it before us, is no longer a question in the theory 258 of knowledge, it concerns the structure of the universe itself.
Page 295 - For to foresee consists of projecting into the future what has been perceived in the past, or of imagining for a later time a new grouping, in a new order, of elements already perceived. But that which has never been perceived, and which is at the same time simple, is necessarily unforseeable.
Page 297 - Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs. This relation is indefinable, just because we are free.
Page 247 - The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves. The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated...
Page 246 - James Mill's denial that similars have anything "really" in common, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities, and the general pulverization of all Experience by association and the mind-dust theory, are examples of what I mean.