Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of ScienceHow does science work? Does it tell us what the world is "really" like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality, Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of one hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Intended for undergraduates and general readers with no prior background in philosophy, Theory and Reality covers logical positivism; the problems of induction and confirmation; Karl Popper's theory of science; Thomas Kuhn and "scientific revolutions"; the views of Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and Paul Feyerabend; and challenges to the field from sociology of science, feminism, and science studies. The book then looks in more detail at some specific problems and theories, including scientific realism, the theory-ladeness of observation, scientific explanation, and Bayesianism. Finally, Godfrey-Smith defends a form of philosophical naturalism as the best way to solve the main problems in the field. Throughout the text he points out connections between philosophical debates and wider discussions about science in recent decades, such as the infamous "science wars." Examples and asides engage the beginning student; a glossary of terms explains key concepts; and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. However, this is a textbook that doesn't feel like a textbook because it captures the historical drama of changes in how science has been conceived over the last one hundred years. Like no other text in this field, Theory and Reality combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates in language that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow. |
Contents
Introduction | xiii |
13 What Kind of Theory? | 3 |
14 Three Answers or Pieces of an Answer | 6 |
A Sketch of the Scientific Revolution | 11 |
Further Reading | 16 |
Logic Plus Empiricism | 17 |
22 The Vienna Circle | 20 |
23 Central Ideas of Logical Positivism | 23 |
84 Leviathan and Latour | 126 |
Further Reading | 133 |
Feminism and Science Studies | 134 |
92 The Man of Reason | 135 |
93 The Case of Primatology | 137 |
94 Feminist Epistemology | 139 |
95 Science Studies the Science Wars and the Sokal Hoax | 142 |
Further Reading | 146 |
24 Problems and Changes | 28 |
25 Logical Empiricism | 32 |
26 On the Fall of Logical Empiricism | 35 |
Induction and Confirmation | 37 |
32 Induction Deduction Confirmation and Explanatory Inference | 38 |
33 The Ravens Problem | 44 |
34 Goodmans New Riddle of Induction | 48 |
Further Reading | 54 |
Popper Conjecture and Refutation | 55 |
43 Popper on Scientific Change | 59 |
44 Objections to Popper on Falsification | 61 |
45 Objections to Popper on Confirmation | 65 |
46 Further Comments on the Demarcation Problem | 69 |
Further Reading | 72 |
Kuhn and Normal Science | 73 |
A Closer Look | 75 |
53 Normal Science | 77 |
54 Anomaly and Crisis | 80 |
55 Wrapup of Normal Science | 82 |
Further Reading | 84 |
Kuhn and Revolutions | 85 |
62 Revolutions and Their Aftermath | 86 |
63 Incommensurability Relativism and Progress | 89 |
64 The XRated Chapter X | 94 |
65 Final Thoughts on Kuhn | 96 |
Further Reading | 99 |
Lakatos Laudan Feyerabend and Frameworks | 100 |
72 Lakatos and Research Programs | 101 |
73 Laudan and Research Traditions | 106 |
74 Anything Goes | 108 |
75 An Argument from History That Haunts Philosophy | 111 |
76 Pluralism and the Ramblings of Madmen | 113 |
Frameworks and TwoProcess Theories of Science | 115 |
Further Reading | 119 |
The Challenge from Sociology of Science | 120 |
83 The Rise of the Strong Program | 123 |
Naturalistic Philosophy in Theory and Practice | 147 |
102 Quine Dewey and Others | 148 |
103 The TheoryLadenness of Observation | 153 |
Further Reading | 160 |
Naturalism and the Social Structure of Science | 161 |
112 Kitcher and the Division of Scientific Labor | 165 |
113 Social Structure and Empiricism | 167 |
Further Reading | 170 |
Scientific Realism | 171 |
122 Approaching Scientific Realism | 172 |
124 Challenges from Traditional Empiricism | 178 |
125 Metaphysical Constructivism | 179 |
126 Van Fraassens View | 181 |
127 Representation Models and Truth Optional Section | 184 |
Further Reading | 187 |
Explanation | 188 |
132 The Rise and Fall of the Covering Law Theory of Explanation | 189 |
133 Causation Unification and More | 192 |
134 Laws and Causes Optional Section | 198 |
Further Reading | 199 |
Bayesianism and Modern Theories of Evidence | 200 |
142 Understanding Evidence with Probability | 201 |
143 The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability | 203 |
144 Assessing Bayesianism | 206 |
145 Scientific Realism and Theories of Evidence | 208 |
146 Procedural Naturalism Optional Section | 212 |
Further Reading | 215 |
Empiricism Naturalism and Scientific Realism? | 217 |
152 The Apparent Tensions | 218 |
153 Empiricism Reformed | 219 |
154 A Last Challenge | 225 |
155 The Future | 228 |
Glossary | 231 |
References | 241 |
| 253 | |
Other editions - View all
Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Peter Godfrey-Smith Limited preview - 2009 |
Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Peter Godfrey-Smith No preview available - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
approach argued argument basic Bayes's theorem Bayesianism behavior biology Carnap causation chapter claims concepts confirmation covering law theory criticism debate deductive degrees of belief describe developed discussion distinction ence epistemology evidence example experience explanation explanatory inference famous feminist Feyerabend field Fraassen framework Further Reading Galileo grue Hempel holism hypothesis ideas induction issues kind Kitcher knowledge Kuhn Lakatos Lakatos's language Latour Laudan logical empiricism logical empiricists logical positivism logical positivists look mathematical naturalistic nature normal science norms objects observation paradigm patterns philosophy of science picture Popper possible predictions principles prior probabilities probability problem questions Quine rational ravens are black reality reason research program role scientific change scientific realism Scientific Revolution scientific theories scientists seems sense Shapin sociology of science sometimes tend term testing theoretical theory of science things thought tion true truth understand Vienna Circle


