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Page 353
... Peter struck Mal- chus " is at once a predication about Peter and a ( different ) predication about Malchus ; either " Peter " or " Malchus " may be taken as a logical subject - as Aristotle observed NAMING AND PREDICATING 353.
... Peter struck Mal- chus " is at once a predication about Peter and a ( different ) predication about Malchus ; either " Peter " or " Malchus " may be taken as a logical subject - as Aristotle observed NAMING AND PREDICATING 353.
Page 354
... Peter " being the subject of " Peter struck Malchus " and " Malchus " the subject of " Peter struck Malchus . " I reply that for logic these are not different propositions ; they have , on the contrary , just the same logical content ...
... Peter " being the subject of " Peter struck Malchus " and " Malchus " the subject of " Peter struck Malchus . " I reply that for logic these are not different propositions ; they have , on the contrary , just the same logical content ...
Page 355
... Peter struck Malchus " the predicate is " . struck Malchus " if we take " Peter " as the subject and " Peter struck - " if we take " Malchus . " As I said before , either choice of subject is legitimate . The proposition relates both to ...
... Peter struck Malchus " the predicate is " . struck Malchus " if we take " Peter " as the subject and " Peter struck - " if we take " Malchus . " As I said before , either choice of subject is legitimate . The proposition relates both to ...
Contents
Freges Ontology | 3 |
Freges Hidden Nominalism | 42 |
Professor Bergmann and Freges Hidden | 68 |
Copyright | |
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according answer appears apply argu argument assertion belong called characters claim common complete compound concept connection consider contains corresponding course defined definition denotation designation determined discussion distinction distinguish doctrine entities example exist explain expression extension fact falls false follows Frege function further give given Grundgesetze hand Hence hold idea identity important incomplete indication individual kind language least logical mathematics matter means merely mind nature never notion object occurs ontology ordinary particular Peter Philosophical phrase physical possible predicate present principle problem proper name properties proposition question range reason recognize reference regard relation requires Review rule Russell seems sense sentence simple speak square stand statement suggests suppose symbol taken theory things thought tion true truth unsaturated variable whole writings