America in Vietnam: The War That Couldn't Be Won
This controversial and timely book about the American experience in Vietnam provides the first full exploration of the perspectives of the North Vietnamese leadership before, during, and after the war. Herbert Y. Schandler offers unique insights into the mindsets of the North Vietnamese and their response to diplomatic and military actions of the Americans, laying out the full scale of the disastrous U.S. political and military misunderstandings of Vietnamese history and motivations. Including frank quotes from Vietnamese leaders, the book offers important new knowledge that allows us to learn invaluable lessons from the perspective of a victorious enemy.
Unlike most military officers who served in Vietnam, Schandler is convinced the war was unwinnable, no matter how long America stayed the course or how many resources were devoted to it. He is remarkably qualified to make these judgments as an infantry commander during the Vietnam War, a Pentagon policymaker, and a scholar who taught at West Point and National Defense University. His extensive personal interviews with North Vietnamese are drawn from his many trips to Hanoi after the war. Schandler provides not only a definitive analysis of the American failure in Vietnam but a crucial foundation for exploring the potential for success in the current guerrilla wars the United States is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Chapter 02 The Enemy
Chapter 03 The American Commitment
Chapter 04 The Road to War
Chapter 05 America Enters the War
The Futile Effort to Break Hanois Will
Chapter 07 The Ground War
Guns and Butter?
Chapter 10 The Nixon Presidency
Chapter 11 Conclusion
About the Author
Chapter 08 The Tet Offensive
Other editions - View all
achieve administration advisers air strikes airpower American forces American military American troops army ARVN attack battalions bombing campaign buildup Cambodia Chinese civilian combat commander commitment communist conﬂict continued decision defeating the enemy deployments Diem’s Dinh Diem effect effort enemy’s ﬁght ﬁnally ﬁrst ﬂow French Geneva go Dinh goal ground forces Hanoi Ho Chi Minh increased inﬂuence insurgency itary Joint Chiefs Kennedy Kissinger Laos leadership limited major military action military chiefs military forces military leaders military operations military victory Minh Missed Opportunities namese nation negotiations Ngo Dinh Diem Nixon North Viet North Vietnamese North Vietnamese forces objectives ofﬁcials peace people’s political President Johnson president’s reﬂected Rolling Thunder Saigon Schandler secretary of defense seventeenth parallel South Viet South Vietnam South Vietnamese government Southeast Asia Soviet strategy targets Tet offensive tion U.S. Congress United States—Vietnam Relations Vietcong Vietnam War Westmoreland