Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the CourtsIn Terror in the Balance, Posner and Vermeule take on civil libertarians of both the left and the right, arguing that the government should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the times of emergency. They emphasize the virtues of unilateral executive actions and argue for making extensive powers available to the executive as warranted. The judiciary should neither second-guess security policy nor interfere on constitutional grounds. In order to protect citizens, government can and should use any legal instrument that is warranted under ordinary cost-benefit analysis. The value gained from the increase in security will exceed the losses from the decrease in liberty. At a time when the 'struggle against violent extremism' dominates the United States' agenda, this important and controversial work will spark discussion in the classroom and intellectual press alike. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 84
Page
Security, Liberty, and the Courts Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule. This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS Introduction 3 PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY One.
Security, Liberty, and the Courts Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule. This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS Introduction 3 PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY One.
Page
... CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY One Emergencies, Tradeoffs, and Deference 15 Two The Panic Theory 59 Three The Democratic Failure Theory 87 Four The Ratchet Theory and Other Long-Run Effects 131 PART II: APPLICATIONS Five Institutional ...
... CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY One Emergencies, Tradeoffs, and Deference 15 Two The Panic Theory 59 Three The Democratic Failure Theory 87 Four The Ratchet Theory and Other Long-Run Effects 131 PART II: APPLICATIONS Five Institutional ...
Page 3
... be drawn from this history. The weight of academic commentary argues that the history is one of political and constitutional failure. The emergency causes panic; the public characteristically misunderstands the 3 Introduction.
... be drawn from this history. The weight of academic commentary argues that the history is one of political and constitutional failure. The emergency causes panic; the public characteristically misunderstands the 3 Introduction.
Page 4
... constitutional success. The essential feature of the emergency is that national security is threatened; because the ... constitutional structure remains unaffected by the emergency. In the United States, unlike in many other countries ...
... constitutional success. The essential feature of the emergency is that national security is threatened; because the ... constitutional structure remains unaffected by the emergency. In the United States, unlike in many other countries ...
Page 5
... constitutional doctrines that require the executive to work in tandem with Congress. Except when the context requires greater precision, we will refer to both types of scholars as civil libertarians. The second view of history suggests ...
... constitutional doctrines that require the executive to work in tandem with Congress. Except when the context requires greater precision, we will refer to both types of scholars as civil libertarians. The second view of history suggests ...
Other editions - View all
Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts Eric A. Posner,Adrian Vermeule Limited preview - 2007 |
Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts Eric A. Posner,Adrian Vermeule Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman Adrian Vermeule al Qaeda American argue argument benefits Carolene Products chapter citizens civil libertarian view civil liberties claim coercive interrogation Congress consequentialist constitutional constrain costs courts crime criminal critics decision defendant deferential democratic failure theory detain detention effects emer emergency policies emergency powers enemy combatants evaluate ex ante example executive action fear gency Geneva Conventions government’s Hamdan Hamdi harm increase institutional Jon Elster judges judicial deference judicial review jury justified Korematsu law enforcement laws of war lawyers legislative liberal legalism libertarian panics majority Mark Tushnet measures ment military minorities national security normal normative officials outlaw and forgive political opponents president president’s problem produce prosecutions protect public threat Qaeda ratchet account reason restrictions risk rules security and liberty slippery slope social statist ratchet statute statutory authorization strict scrutiny suggest Sunstein supra note target terrorism terrorist tion tive torture tradeoff thesis trials Tushnet United violation welfare