Metaethical Subjectivism

Front Cover
Ashgate, 2006 - Philosophy - 129 pages
0 Reviews
Metaethical subjectivism, the idea that the truth or falsity of moral statements is contingent upon the attitudes or conventions of observers, is often regarded as a lurid philosophical doctrine which generates much psychological resistance to its acceptance. In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defense of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes the rival doctrine of metaethical objectivism for lacking both 'completeness' and 'soundness', argues that a defense of metaethical subjectivism requires no special semantic analysis of moral language and defends the plausibility of metaethical subjectivism as explaining key intractable disagreements in moral philosophy. Double concludes by suggesting that the acceptance of metaethical subjectivism is better for constructing theories of normative ethics and moral practice than is metaethical objectivism.

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

About the author (2006)

Dr Richard Double has written The Non-Reality of Free Will, Metaphilosophy and Free Will, and Beginning Philosophy. He has also written over 50 articles and 20 reviews. Upon retirement he was full professor of philosophy and chair at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, and voted University Researcher of the Year for 2003-04.

Bibliographic information