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administration of justice adopted American Bar Association annulling appellate courts appointed authority Bill of Rights ciple common law consti constitutional law continental countries declared void delay determination discussion distinction due process duty effect election enacted enforced England equal protection equity essential exercise existing federal constitution federal courts federal government Federalist Foot Page Note Fourteenth Amendment fundamental governmental guaranty House of Lords illustration independence judges judgment judi judicial decisions judicial office judicial power judicial procedure judiciary jurisprudence lative lecture legis legislative acts legislative power legislature limited litigation Madison ment modern Montesquieu Note Citations party political powers of government practical prejudice from error principle Privy Council process of law provision public opinion question recall of judicial recent reform remedy says separation of powers sovereignty statute supreme court tion tional tive trial tution Unconstitutional United validity violative vote written constitution written opinions Yale Law Journal
Page 15 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 57 - And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will control acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void ; for when an act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void ; and therefore in 8 E 330 ab Thomas Tregor's case on the statutes of W.
Page 68 - There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal ; that the servant is above his master ; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves ; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only...
Page 111 - In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.
Page 27 - The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to- wit : Those which are legislative, to one ; those which are executive, to another ; and those which are judicial, to another.
Page 26 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Page 120 - We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed, by way of discrimination, against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.
Page 15 - In every government there are three sorts of power; the legislative; the executive, in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard to things that depend on the civil law.
Page 16 - There would be an end of everything, were the same man ' or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
Page 203 - The want of a. provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose.