Free Will and Luck
Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
ability able act freely action and moral actual world agency agent causation agent-causal agent’s agnostic akratic action alternative possibilities argued basically free actions believe Beth Beth’s big bang Bob’s brainwashing causally determined chance chapter claim Clarke compatibilism compatible deciding at noon decision Dennett desire deterministic world deterministically caused difference DSLs entail Ernie Ernie’s event-causal libertarian exercise ﬁnd ﬁrst Fischer and Ravizza ﬂip Frankfurt-style Fred free agents free and morally freely A-s Galen Strawson Humean identiﬁed inﬂuence intention to ﬂex intentionally issue John Fischer Kane Kane’s killing kind laws of nature libertarian view Libet manipulation matter of luck Mele modest libertarianism morally responsible action O’Connor one’s otherwise past and laws Pereboom performed Plum possible world present luck promise proximal intention reactive attitudes reason reﬂection relevant requires S-able scenario signiﬁcant soft libertarianism speciﬁc sponsibility steal the car story sufﬁcient conditions terministic things unsheddable values urge zygote