Skeptical Theism: New Essays
Trent Dougherty, Justin P. McBrayer
Oxford University Press, 2014 - Philosophy - 337 pages
Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Whilst some philosophers argue that the problem of evil is strong evidence for atheism, others claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. On the other hand, skeptical theists believe in God, but struggle with the task of explaining the role of evils in our world.
Skeptical theism tackles the problem of evil by proposing a limited skepticism about the purposes of God, and our abilities to determine whether any given instance is truly an example of gratuitous evil. This collection of 22 original essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Divided into four sections, the volume discusses the epistemology of sceptical theism, conditions of reasonable epistemic access, the implications for theism, and the implications for morality.
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abductive Agnostic Agnosticism argue argument from evil Ashley’s suffering balance justified Bergmann Chris’s Christian claim cognitive commonsense morality conclusion conditional conditional probability CORNEA creatures defense demonism divine deception doesn’t doubt Dougherty Draper E1 and E2 entails epistemic probability evidential argument facie justification fact false given theism God-justifying reasons horrors Howard-Snyder human Humean humility hypothesis inference justified in believing Maitzen Moral Skepticism naturalism NG-Reasons non-inferential justification noseeum obligation to intervene one’s Paul Draper perfect permitting E1 Phenomenal Conservatism plausible positive skeptical theism possible potential reasons predictions prevent principle prior probability problem of evil proposition reason for thinking reason to believe reasons for allowing reasons for permitting relevant representative response Rowe’s sample Schellenberg second premise seemingly gratuitous evil seems skeptical theism Suppose theodicy theory there’s things tion total consequences total evidence true truth undefeated undercutting defeater version of skeptical version of theism withhold judgment Wykstra