Security Awareness in the 1990's: Feature Articles from the Security Awareness Bulletin
DIANE Publishing, Apr 1, 1997 - 206 pages
Presents 32 feature articles from the Security Awareness Bulletin, representing the work of many authors. Includes: the emerging foreign intelligence threat (counterintelligence challenges; what is the threat?), espionage and espionage case studies (Randy Miles Jeffries; Albert Sombolay; Aldrich Ames); information systems security (security measures; Boeing hacker incident; understanding the computer criminal); security policy and programs (national OPSEC program; technical security; TSCM); industrial security (arms control inspections); and the threat to U.S. technology (export control violations; foreign economic threat).
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activities adversary agencies agents Aldrich Ames Ames Ames's arms control arrest assessment assigned automated briefings Bulletin Chuvakhin CIA and FBI CIA IG report CIA officer classified information clearance communications compromised computer crime contractors counterintelligence countermeasures countries curity dead drop Defense Investigative Service Department of Defense developed Director Division documents DTIC DTIRP economic Edward Lee Howard efforts electronic employees equipment espionage export control facility Federal foreign intelligence Fort Stewart gence hackers identified illegal information systems intelligence services intelligence threat interest investigation involved Jeffries meeting ment military monitoring national security NISPOM operations OPSEC PERSEREC Personnel security polygraph Previously printed problem protect recruited response rity Rome Rosario secu security awareness security educators security programs sensitive sources Soviet Union specific supervisors survey targeted Task Force technical telephone tion treaty TSCM U.S. Government vulnerabilities
Page 203 - President to be against the national interest, and (B) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.
Page 200 - The product ordered is incompatible with the technical level of the country to which the product is being shipped. For example, semiconductor manufacturing equipment would be of little use in a country without an electronics industry4.
Page 150 - US government and its supporting contractors can deny to potential adversaries information about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations.
Page 200 - The customer is willing to pay cash for a very expensive item when the terms of the sale call for financing.
Page 92 - Party to conceal evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under this Convention. 42. If the inspected State Party provides less than full access to places, activities, or information, it shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the possible non-compliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.
Page 199 - ... those of an article or service used for civil applications; or (b) Is specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military application, and has significant military or intelligence applicability such that control under this subchapter is necessary. The intended use of the article or service after its export (ie, for a military or civilian purpose) is not relevant in determining whether the article or service is subject to the controls of this subchapter.
Page 197 - FBI investigations have identified that some foreign governments exploit existing non-government affiliated organizations or create new ones, such as friendship societies, international exchange organizations, import-export companies and other entities that have frequent contact with foreigners, to gather intelligence and to station intelligence collectors. They conceal government involvement in these organizations and present them as purely private entities in order to cover their intelligence operations....
Page 91 - The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
Page 195 - NACIC noted that (b]ecause they are so easily accessed and intercepted, corporate telecommunications — particularly international telecommunications — provide a highly vulnerable and lucrative source for anyone interested in obtaining trade secrets or competitive information. Because of the increased usage of these links for bulk computer data transmission and electronic mail, intelligence collectors find telecommunications intercepts cost-effective. For example, foreign intelligence collectors...