A Common-sense Approach to High-technology Export Controls: A Report of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
A Note on the Costs of Export Controls to U S Firms | 7 |
National Security Implications of Export Controls on High Performance | 21 |
Copyright | |
3 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
advanced microprocessors Airbus aircraft billion Boeing capability China chips CISAC Clipper Chip CoCom COMINT Commerce Department communications competitive components concerns countries cryptography currently decontrol defense destinations dual-use economic costs electronic embargo encryption algorithms encryption products encryption software end-users engines EPCI example export license foreign availability foreign policy hardware high-performance computers high-technology industries high-technology products imposed Intel intelligence Iran Air manufacturing market share mass-market software MCST microprocessors military missile MTCR Mtops multilateral National Academy non-proliferation North Korea nuclear proliferation nuclear weapons overseas performance levels personal computers potential powerful computers processors proliferation require restrictions Russian sanctions Section sectors semiconductor Soviet SPARC specific stealth aircraft strong encryption Sun Microsystems Sun's supercomputers suppliers Taiwan telecommunications threshold tions trade transfer U.S. companies U.S. Department U.S. export controls U.S. firms U.S. government U.S. microprocessors U.S. national security United Washington workstations
References to this book
Trade Politics: International, Domestic, and Regional Perspectives Brian Hocking,Steven McGuire No preview available - 1999 |