Signaling of Creditworthiness in Rural Credit Markets: An Analysis of Group Lending in Costa RicaUniversity of Wisconsin--Madison, 1989 - 504 pages |
Contents
Abstract ii | 7 |
Country and Program Background | 8 |
Introduction | 8 |
Copyright | |
7 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
administrative costs adverse selection agricultural AGYEAR ALAJUELA analysis assume assumption average bank borrower costs clients coefficients collateral requirements competitive Costa Rica credit group credit program credit subsidies creditworthiness debt default risk delinquency rates developed differentiate economic effective equilibrium Expectations of Default expected profits external factors Figure FINCA formal credit formal lender function funds FVISITS Grameen Bank group credit group lending higher homogeneity Huppi incentive income increase indifference curves individual liability informal lenders Informal Screening informal sector informational asymmetries INFRINDX institutional internal delinquency internal rates investment joint liability loan contract loan demand loan offer loan period loan repayment loan supply maximizing membership nominal interest rate opportunity cost optimal organizational ORGSC PENAS BLANCAS problems R₁ rate of return reduce repay repayment performance repayment rate risk types riskiness rural credit markets sample savings small farmers social Table theory transaction costs variables written code