## Game Theory: A Critical TextIn recent years game theory has swept through all of the social sciences. Its practitioners have great designs for it, claiming that it offers an opportunity to unify the social sciences and that it it the natural foundation of a rational theory of society. Game Theory is for those who are intrigued but baffled by these claims, and daunted by the technical demands of most introductions to the subject. Requiring no more than simple arithmetic, the book: * Traces the origins of Game Theory and its philosophical premises * Looks at its implications for the theory of bargaining and social contract theory * Gives a detailed exposition of all of the major `games' including the famous `prisoner's dilemma' * Analyses cooperative, non cooperative, repeated, evolutionary and experimental games |

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### Contents

III | 1 |

IV | 2 |

V | 3 |

VI | 4 |

VII | 6 |

VIII | 7 |

X | 27 |

XI | 28 |

LVIII | 163 |

LIX | 164 |

LX | 165 |

LXI | 168 |

LXII | 170 |

LXIII | 171 |

LXIV | 172 |

LXV | 175 |

XII | 31 |

XIII | 33 |

XIV | 35 |

XV | 36 |

XVI | 38 |

XVII | 40 |

XVIII | 41 |

XIX | 44 |

XX | 45 |

XXI | 47 |

XXII | 52 |

XXIII | 56 |

XXIV | 58 |

XXV | 60 |

XXVI | 61 |

XXVII | 68 |

XXVIII | 73 |

XXIX | 75 |

XXX | 78 |

XXXI | 79 |

XXXII | 80 |

XXXIII | 81 |

XXXIV | 85 |

XXXV | 90 |

XXXVI | 92 |

XXXVII | 96 |

XXXVIII | 99 |

XXXIX | 103 |

XL | 108 |

XLI | 111 |

XLII | 114 |

XLIII | 115 |

XLIV | 118 |

XLV | 119 |

XLVI | 122 |

XLVII | 125 |

XLVIII | 127 |

XLIX | 131 |

L | 135 |

LI | 137 |

LII | 140 |

LIII | 146 |

LIV | 148 |

LV | 150 |

LVI | 152 |

LVII | 160 |

LXVI | 180 |

LXVII | 185 |

LXVIII | 186 |

LXIX | 187 |

LXX | 189 |

LXXI | 191 |

LXXII | 192 |

LXXIII | 194 |

LXXIV | 202 |

LXXV | 205 |

LXXVII | 206 |

LXXVIII | 209 |

LXXX | 211 |

LXXXI | 214 |

LXXXII | 220 |

LXXXIII | 223 |

LXXXIV | 227 |

LXXXV | 232 |

LXXXVI | 236 |

LXXXVII | 241 |

LXXXVIII | 245 |

LXXXIX | 247 |

XC | 248 |

XCI | 251 |

XCII | 252 |

XCIII | 255 |

XCIV | 258 |

XCV | 264 |

XCVI | 266 |

XCVII | 267 |

XCVIII | 268 |

XCIX | 269 |

C | 275 |

CI | 285 |

CII | 289 |

CIII | 292 |

CIV | 293 |

CV | 299 |

CVI | 301 |

CVII | 302 |

CVIII | 304 |

CIX | 334 |

348 | |

359 | |

362 | |

### Common terms and phrases

action agreement analysis argument assume assumption axiom bargaining game bargaining problem behaviour beliefs best reply cent Chapter choice choose co-operation co-operative common knowledge convention defect equal equilibrium in pure EvGT evolution evolutionary game theory example expected returns expected utility free rider free rider problem game theory game's Hawk-Dove game indeterminacy individual information set instrumentally rational interaction irrational Jack Jack's Jill Jill's maximises mixed strategies moral mutations Nash backward induction Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium concept Nash solution Nash's NEMS node norms offer opponent outcome person play h play Rl population possible predictions preferences Prisoner's Dilemma Prisoners Dilemma probability psychological pay-offs pure strategy Nash rational agents rational players rationalisable reason rejection replicator dynamic result risk aversion Rubinstein rules Section sequential equilibrium social SPNE Stag-Hunt strategy Nash equilibria strictly dominant strategy subgame Suppose theorists trembles unique utility function