Learning by Doing: Precommitment and Infant-industry Protection
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1994 - Relaciones económicas internacionales - Modelos matemáticos - 28 pages
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ability to precommit assumptions about precommitment behaviour Bertrand Competition cost of funds Cournot dc2 dc2 demands and linear different assumptions Discount Factor Eaton and Grossman envelope theorem equation Export subsidies firm's first-order conditions firm's reaction function firms cannot precommit first-period output foreign firm foreign firm's reaction FPCE and GPCE Fudenberg and Tirole full precommitment equilibrium future actions future output future subsidies government can precommit government cannot precommit home firm incentive INFANT-INDUSTRY PROTECTION International Trade Journal of Economics levels of output linear demands linear learning marginal cost maximise Neary negative normalised Number of Foreign oligopolistic oligopoly optimal first-period subsidy optimal policy optimal second-period subsidy optimal subsidy output levels partial derivative period-1 subsidy period-2 precommit to future Product Differentiation rate of learning second-order condition Section sequential equilibrium social cost static Brander-Spencer strategic complement strategic substitutability strategic trade policy subsidy in FPCE subsidy is lower total welfare University College Dublin zero