Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-industry Protection |
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11 pages matching firm's first-order conditions in this book
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Contents
Introduction | 1 |
The Model | 2 |
Optimal Subsidies with Full Precommitment | 5 |
11 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
ability to precommit ac₂ assumptions about precommitment behaviour Bertrand Competition c₂ CEPR cost of funds Cournot different assumptions Discussion Papers envelope theorem equation Export subsidies firm's first-order conditions firm's reaction function firms cannot precommit first-period output foreign firm foreign firm's reaction Fudenberg and Tirole full precommitment equilibrium fully-optimal future actions future output future subsidies government can precommit government cannot precommit home firm incentive increasing INFANT-INDUSTRY PROTECTION International Trade Journal of Economics Leahy Learning-by-doing linear demands linear learning Macroeconomic marginal cost maximise Neary negative normalised number of foreign oligopolistic oligopoly optimal first-period subsidy optimal second-period subsidy optimal subsidy output levels partial derivative period-1 subsidy precommit to future PRECOMMITMENT AND INFANT-INDUSTRY product differentiation rate of learning s₂ second-order condition Section sequential equilibrium social cost static Brander-Spencer strategic complement strategic substitutability strategic trade policy subsidy in GPCE subsidy is lower temporary subsidy total welfare University College Dublin