Democracy, Education, and Equality: Graz-Schumpeter Lectures
John E. Roemer, Elizabeth S and a Varick Stout Professor of Political Science and Economics John E Roemer
Cambridge University Press, Jan 9, 2006 - Business & Economics - 177 pages
This study asks whether democracy, modeled as competition between political parties that represent different interests in the polity, will result in educational funding policies that will, at least eventually, produce citizens who have equal capacities (human capital), thus breaking the link between family background and child prospects. In other words, will democracy engender, through the educational finance policies it produces, a state of equal opportunity in the long run? Several models of the problem are studied, which vary according to the educational technology posited, i.e. the relationship between family inputs, school inputs, and the eventual human capital of the adult the child becomes.
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A Brief Overview
Models of Party Competition
Democratic Competition over Educational Investment
The Dynamics of Human Capital with Exogenous Growth
The Dynamics of Human Capital with Endogenous Growth
Estimation of Technological Parameters
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adult analysis average binary relation Chapter characterize child coefficient of variation concave constant constraints convergence to equality decreasing define democracy dependent variable distribution function distribution of human Downsian dynamic dynasty econometrics economic educational investment election endogenous equality of wages Equation exist factions follows fraction converge GRADE hence hispanic Hotelling-Downs model human capital ideal policy income inequality initial distribution laissez-faire large policy space level of human limit point logarithm of R's manifold maximize median Militants Nash equilibrium natural logarithm NLSY non-negative opportunist politics pair of policies parents Pareto efficient pivot plays the ideal political competition positive probability probability of victory problem Proof Proposition PUNE quantile quasi-PUNEs Reformists regression relative bargaining returns to scale Roemer sequence simulation SMSA solution solve Theorem tion total resource bundle unidimensional utility function Variable Name Description vote Wittman-Nash equilibrium yR(h zero