Essays on the powers of the human mind [orig. publ. as Essays on the intellectual powers of man and Essays on the active powers of man]. To which are added, An essay on quantity, and an analysis of Aristotle's logic
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absurd active power affirmed agreeable animal apparent magnitude appears appetites apprehend argument Aristotle attention attributes axioms beauty believe Bishop Berkeley body brute called Cartes categorical syllogisms cause Cicero colour common sense conceive conception conclusion conduct conscious consider contrary degree demonstration distinct distinguish doctrine effect efficient cause Epicurus Euclid evidence existence express external objects faculties false feeling figure give hath human Hume imagination immediate object impression judge judgment justice kind knowledge language laws Locke logicians Malebranche mankind mathematical matter meaning memory mind monads moral natural philosophy natural signs nature necessary necessary truths never notion objects of sense objects of thought observed operations opinion passion perceive perception person philosophers Plato predicate principles of action produce proper properly proposition qualities rational reason regard seems sensation signify Sir Isaac Newton sophism species suppose syllogism taste things true truth understanding virtue vulgar
Page 533 - My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go: my heart shall not reproach me so long as I live.
Page 528 - And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked, and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons.
Page 250 - A * great philosopher has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive signification and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavor to confirm it by some arguments which I...
Page 252 - Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT.
Page 74 - It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks: I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.
Page 669 - reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office, than to serve and obey them.
Page 92 - All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive — there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another.
Page 127 - Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is.
Page 254 - ... all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters...
Page 455 - I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.