to Namur, although this was not really the case: erroneous orders were consequently given, and it was discovered, a little later, that they had marched to Wavre; much precious time was lost, and Blucher joined the English at Waterloo.1 19. An army in retreat, should not neglect to send patrols upon its flanks, to give an account of the enemy's movements; but, if this duty is executed in a careless manner, the consequences may prove most fatal.2 20. "In the reconnaissance of maritime coasts," the first object to examine is, the nature of the coasts; if they are open to view; if they are fit for landing: it is important to judge correctly and give a full account of all that which characterises accessible places, the dangers to which they lay open, and the means to overcome them. Coasts are high, or covered with rocks, which render them at first more or less dangerous, or there are cliffs, which, in supposing that they do not altogether prevent access, yet, render them very difficult. The promontories and headlands intended for the establishment of forts and batteries to defend the accessible points and the adjacent islands, serve as advanced works, which, when good measures are early taken, perplex always the attempts of the enemy.3 21. In reconnoitring a coast from the sea, the following points must be entered upon as minutely as possible. The most favourable positions for a force to land: they are generally to be found at points where rivers or streams flow into the sea; if none such exist, the next best are long, low promontories jutting out into the sea, of about a mile in width, so that the first division that landed should, in taking up a position to cover the disembarkation of the others, be able to rest its flanks on the sea, and so have the fire from the fleet to sweep across its front in case of attack. No place is good for the disembarkation of an army unless the depth of water and the configuration of the coast and general character of its slopes enables one to derive full advantage from the fire of the fleet; this must always be borne in mind when selecting a point for the purpose. All bays, inlets, and the mouths of rivers to be carefully examined, with this object in view; the best position to be taken up by the fleet to cover the landing to be noted on the sketch; the roads leading from the shore inland with distances to principal towns. Are there woods near, and what is their extent; are there any wharfs, and what are the facilities for constructing them; is there a dangerous surf, or can boats land at all times. What are the winds that render approach to the shore dangerous; is the anchorage good; is the bottom sand or rock; what is the height of the ordinary and spring tides; is good fresh water to be had in large quantities upon landing, and is it from wells, streams or tanks; what is the position and number of the enemy's forces in the neighbourhood. Soundings must be carefully taken, showing how near the different classes of vessels can approach. The prevailing winds and currents; is the coast bordered by downs; are there precipitous cliffs. If there is a If there is a beach, is it of mud or sand. In reporting upon a coast, with a defensive object in view, the points where landing can be effected, are to be minutely examined and sketched. All bays, coves and harbours to be surveyed, and reports made as to the best means of defending them; the nature of the tides; all islands, towns, villages, and houses on coast to be reported upon; all forts and other coast defences, the nature of their armament, capabilities of defence, their existing garrisons, and the strength of their garrisons should be for an effective defence. The best position for camps of observation, to guard against invasion, and what is the best scheme for the general defence of the coast.1 SECTION II. ADVANCED GUARDS. 1. When an army is in column of march, it should have advanced guards, and flanking parties to examine well the country in front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as to enable the main body to deploy into position.2 2. When an army marches from one camp to another, it is preceded by an advanced guard. Its flanks, when marching, are covered according to circumstances, by a greater or lesser number of light troops, disposed with reference to the situation of the enemy. It is followed by a rear guard.1 3. The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or retiring, but in manoeuvring. An advanced guard should be composed of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy, and by battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, the officers, and the men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and knowledge. A corps, deficient in instruction, is only an embarrassment to an advanced guard.2 4. Light troops should be intelligently employed, and they should not be spared; for it is chiefly in this kind of service that they are useful if they allow an army to be surprised, their commander has failed in his duties; he cannot allege a good excuse. It is especially in intersected and wooded countries, that precautions must be redoubled. Skirmishers, thrown out on both flanks, should be supported by detachments appointed for them to rally upon, and should be, moreover strong enough to defend, at need for some time, defiles which might afford to the enemy the means of turning the flank of the army.3 5. If an army is moving on a narrow front, one of its brigades or divisions, combined with cavalry and artillery, may form the advanced guard, extending across the whole front. But where corps are moving each on its own roads, as at Solferino, each will form its own advanced guard: and these have generally consisted of from one-tenth to one-twentieth of the army or corps. A small party of horse precedes the main body, to obtain and bring the earliest intelligence. But of the main body the infantry should march first; for neither artillery nor cavalry should enter any defile which has not been first explored and its flanks secured, by infantry. The artillery may, in general, properly be placed next the leading battalion of the advanced guard. The flanks of the column should be covered to a distance of some hundred yards by parties of horse, and a chain of riflemen, at 40 or 50 paces from each other, should extend within the mounted troops. In a halt of any duration, the advanced guard should form order of battle, and cover its fronts and flanks with advanced posts. The distance, then, must be such as to give the columns time to deploy sufficient force to meet any probable first attacks, and to cover the deployment of the rest. If an army be moving in numerous columns, at just intervals, it will need less preparation than when the roads refuse to lend themselves to any but deep columns, and too narrow or too extended fronts. Frederick's advanced guards observed a distance. from the army of from 1 to 3 miles; larger armies and less compact columns might extend it to 5 miles nor should this be greatly exceeded, except in the single case that it was desired to seize on some point or position, the possession of which would be worth the risk.1 6. The aim being to gain intelligence of the enemy, and to be informed of his arrival as soon as he approaches, it is most useful to reconnoitre at the greatest possible distance, without, however, compromising the detachments. The advanced guard of an army which is not in presence of the enemy, ought at least to be a day's march from the main body; and that of a division several hours in advance. 7 When we are at a distance from an enemy, who is strong enough to offer us battle, and are marching towards him, we should occupy by advanced guards and light troops, at least the space of a day's march distance around us, so as to be informed of his movements and modify our own in consequence.3 8. If a body of troops were to remain drawn up to oppose the advance of a superior force, on a plain, where the whole formation was visible, the attempt would be futile and disastrous. The enemy would at once attack with superior force, and compel a costly retreat under penalty of route or destruction. But skilfully disposed, in a good position, across the path of an adversary advancing in an ordinarily broken and difficult country, the risk is greatly reduced. If the armies have been manoeuvring near each other, with numbers and positions 1 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. VI, 2 Marmont. 3 Ibid. constantly changing, and plans and combinations only to be guessed at, the leader who comes on such an obstacle in his path cannot, at first, know the amount of force which bars his way, sufficiently well to begin an immediate battle. He will generally pause, reconnoitre, and feel his way; and will defer a general attack till he shall be ready to deploy a force sufficient to render him confident of success. In the meanwhile, the commander of the smaller force must watch carefully the dispositions of his adversary, and combine, in an unusual degree, resolution with prudence. For if he were to engage the whole of his troops, throughout the extent of their front, it would be out of his power to withdraw when the adversary had deployed a superior force, and he would be outflanked and heavily defeated. On the other hand, if he were to give way before the enemy had made a considerable deployment, the advance, which it was his business to check, would not be retarded. He must occupy his ground to the last moment possible without committing himself to a general action, and must then effect an orderly retreat. At the first opportunity offered by the ground, he must repeat the manoeuvre. Meanwhile the adversary will have again formed order of march, and, on approaching him, must once more form for battle, with more or less promptitude in proportion to the confidence he may feel that the obstructing force is still inferior to him. In this way the day's march, which, if unopposed, might have stretched to twenty miles, may be reduced to six or three; and time may thus be gained for employing to decisive advantage the rest of that army which uses the retarding force.1 9. In the German war of 1866,'-orders were sent to the commanders of the corps* at Trautenau and Skalitz, not to compromise themselves in a serious action, but to retreat slowly, if pressed by superior numbers. These orders were neglected. If they had been observed, it is doubtful whether the Crown Prince would not have pushed them back, and concentrated his army on the Austrian communications, before Benedek had time to strike down Prince Frederick Charles, and return with his main force to support his troops in front of the second army. The result of the neglect of the orders of the • Austrian. 1 Hamley, Part IV., Chap. I. |