MetaphysicsThis book provides an introduction to metaphysics. At the outset Professor Hamlyn distinguishes two conceptions of metaphysics running through the history of the subject. One, which goes back to Aristotle, is concerned with ontology, and with what has to exist for beings such as we are; the other separates appearance and reality and attempts to establish what really exists. Professor Hamlyn's account of metaphysics conforms with the first tradition. This is not, however, primarily a historical exposition. The discussion concentrates on central metaphysical concepts and problems, including the principles of ontology, substance, particulars and universals, monism and pluralism, space and time, minds, selves and personal identity. Throughout, Professor Hamlyn's thoroughly informed and argued consideration of the topics presents both a persuasive view of the subject and an excellent grounding in it. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Two concepts of metaphysics | 4 |
Appendix the possibility of metaphysics | 9 |
Appearance and reality | 11 |
Arguments for idealism | 17 |
Transcendental idealism | 21 |
Absolute idealism | 24 |
Realism | 28 |
Absolute idealism and logical atomism | 113 |
Space and time | 127 |
Must space and time be infinite? | 134 |
Are space and time essentially one? | 139 |
Temporality and temporal becoming | 144 |
McTaggart on the unreality of time | 150 |
Time and human existence | 158 |
Minds | 161 |
Ontology | 34 |
Beingquabeing | 37 |
Ontological relativity | 43 |
The relativity of philosophical ontologies | 45 |
Formal concepts | 54 |
Substance | 60 |
Must there be substances? | 64 |
The individuation of substances | 69 |
Essentialism | 75 |
Primary and secondary qualities | 82 |
Particular and general | 85 |
Everything that exists is particular | 92 |
Theories of universals | 95 |
The primacy of the particular | 102 |
Simple substances Monism and pluralism | 105 |
Monism and pluralism | 109 |
Bodymind theories | 164 |
Cartesian dualism | 166 |
The criteria of the mental | 170 |
Can dualism be defended? | 175 |
Psychophysical monism | 177 |
Persons and personal identity | 187 |
The Strawsonian concept of a person | 193 |
What are persons? | 201 |
The criteria of identity for persons | 202 |
Survival | 213 |
I | 216 |
Epilogue Man and nature | 219 |
| 221 | |
| 226 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
A-series A. J. Ayer absolute answer appearance and reality argued argument Aristotle Aristotle's ation basic bodily body Bradley Bradley's called Cartesian Cartesian dualism causal Chapter claim concept concerned conclusion connexion consciousness considerations construed criteria criterion dependent Descartes distinction dualism Dummett entities essential example existence experience fact given Hence Hume idea idealism identification involves issues J. J. C. Smart judgment Kant Kantian kinds of thing Leibniz Locke logical atomism London matter meaning mental merely metaphysics mind monism nature Nevertheless notion objects ontology P. F. Strawson Parmenides particular perception perhaps personal identity philosophers physical Plato point of view possible predicate presupposes primary principle properties proposition qualia qualities question realism reason relation seems sensations sense similar simply space spatial spatio-temporal speak Strawson substances suggestion supposed temporal theory thesis thought token-reflexive transcendental idealism true truth understanding universals verificationist Wiggins Wittgenstein